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hTRODGCTlO>: 
"(:-raduate vvith a career!" 
"fvlakc n1ore cash!" 
"Change your life!" 
"It's easy! Just pick up the phone!" 
These were likely some of the exhortations Trina Thon1pson heard 
(between episodes of The Jerry Spiinger Show and Maury Pavich) before 
deciding to enroll at ~1Ionroe College-a career-focused propricta1y (for-
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profit) college vvith can1puscs in Nc\V York and the Caribbean. r Trina 
likely \Vantcd to start a career, n1akc more 1noncy, and change her life vvhcn 
she enrolled in Nionroc's bachelor of business administration program in 
April 2008.2 But after graduating \Vithout a job in April 2009,'.l Trina 
realized that achieving her objectives \vas not as easy as she had been led to 
believe. According to 'frina, her 2. 7 GPA and her "good" attendance 
record should have resulted in job intcrvic,vs and eventually cn1ployn1cnt.-l-
Shortly thereafter, she filed a Ja,vsuit against l'vlonroc alleging inadequate 
carccr-placcn1cnt assistance and seeking a tuition rcin1burscn1cnt of 
$70,000.5 
Trina's la,vsuit, "\vhilc laughable in sonic respects, is nonetheless reflective 
of the con1111oditization of higher education-a trend that pron1otcs the 
endeavor sin1ply as a n1cans to an encl instead of a con1plicated 
undertaking. In that vein, the la,vsuit is also instructive of risks associated 
"\vith the aggressive and often deceptive pron1otion of future benefits by 
colleges havvking their 'vares. Representations niadc by son1c colleges rival 
the nlost optin1istic-and often unfounded-diet pill claims. The end 
result is thousands of "Trinas" entering higher education full of misguided 
optimisn1 and leaving bitter, unfulfilled, and n1ost of all, in debt. Trina is 
lucky-at least she earned a degree. IVfost others in her position do not.6 
Individuals vvho arc induced to enroll in an institution based on 
misrepresentations arc allo"\vcd little recourse to recoup damages they n1ay 
incur.7 The courts have been very reluctant to recognize certain causes of 
action against higher education institutions.B And regulatory safeguards arc 
1. l'vlonroc College, About I\'Ionroe, htlp://www.1nonroccollegc.edu/about1nonroe 
(last visi1cd Aug. 3, 20 I 0). 
2. Trina also earned an Associa1c\ degree fron1 J'vfonroe in Deccn1bcr 2006. 
Con1plainl at 3, Thompson v. l\.Jonroc Coll., :'\o. 251B96-09 (iX.Y. Sup. Ct.July 24, 2009). 
3. See id. (stating that Trina i.~ .~uing because rvionroc has not helped her to secure a 
job). 
4. Jason I<..csslcr, Alumna S11e.1 Coll.ege Bec//11.le She llasw't .Found a Job, Cl'\.'.\.CO:\!, Aug. 4·, 
2009, htlp://\VW\v.cnn.c01n/2009/US/08/03/ncw.yorkjoblcss.graduate/index.htn1l. 
5. See id. (noting that Trina seeks $2,000 Cor slrcss induced by her failed job search). 
6. See, e.g., L.\URA G. K.NAPP ET AL., :'\xr'L CTR. FOR EDLJC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF EDLJC., NCES 2009-1.).), ENROl.l.:\IE!\'T L\ POSTSECONDARY J\""STITL~l"IO.\"S, FALL 2007; 
GRADUATION RATES, 200 I & 2004 COHORTS; A.\"D Fl.\"A.'\CIAL STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 
2007 12 (2009), http://nccs.ed.goy/pubs2009/2009155.pd( (listing the low gradual.ion rates 
for proprietary school students). 
7. Patrick F. Linehan, ])reams Protected: A .1'./euJ Approach lo Policing Prop1ielary Sdwo/s' 
J\1iJrepresenlalions, 89 GEO. LJ. 753, 754 (2001) ("Cnforlunately, cxist.ing legal doctrine and 
regulatory regi1nes arc ill-suited to protect proprietary school students from such predatory 
1narketing practices."). 
8. See id. at 764-65 (describing how the acaden1ic abstention doctrine raises "a 
significant obstacle" to students seeking to recover against propricta1y schools under lort 
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principally focused on protecting public, rather than individual, interests. 
As a result, these individuals arc left to bear the brunt of the in1propcr 
actions of others. And in spite of regulatory safeguards, taxpayers pay a 
heavy price as \Vcll. 
This Article argues that there is an urgent need for tighter regulation of 
higher education rccruitn1cnt and marketing, particularly an1ong colleges in 
the proprietary sector. Specifically, colleges that pro111otc future 
c111ployn1cnt and financial benefits to induce cnrolln1cnt should be sul~jcct 
to heightened disclosure rcquircn1cnts. Akin to the "triad" that n1onitors 
institutions' Title IV financial aid cligibility,~ 1 federal, state, and non-
governn1cntal entities should monitor disclosures. The goal of such 
oversight \vould be to prevent n1isreprcscntations fron1 being n1ade to 
prospective students. 
People vvho lack in-depth knovvlcclge of higher education arc frequent 
targets of higher education n1isreprcsentations. They tend to be poor, 10 
thus rendering the idea of escaping poverty in a matter of n1onths very 
appealing. rfhey also tend to be poorly educated, 11 COJ11ing from fan1ilics 
w:ith little, if any, higher education expericnce. 12 Lastly, they tend to be 
older and further rcn1oved from their last educational experience than 
traditional students, 13 and they arc n1orc likely to have experienced past 
educational difficulty. H These characteristics 111ake these individuals 
particularly susceptible to deceptive n1arketing and unfounded pron1ises.1.1 
law). 
9. Irl. at 783 ("Federal law envisions a highly co1nplcx and co1nprchcnsi\'c 
bureaucratic 'triad,' with state licensing syslcms and accrediting <igencics playing a 
sig11ificant co1nplc1ncntary role alongside federal eligibility and ccr1ilicalion rcquiren1cnts."). 
10. I0!f0rcement qfFerleraf Anti-Fmud lA11Ds in For-Prefit Educatiim: I/earing BijOre the fl. Comm. 
011 Education and the M1orlfrHce, 109th Cong. 52 (2005) Q1crcinaftcr Anti-Fraud lfewi11g.1] 
(statement ofRep.1Jaxine 'Vater5, 1.-Icmbcr, I-I. Co1nn1. on Education and the '·Vorkforcc). 
1 ! . See id. at 8 (providing a quote fron1 an adn1issions counscloP slating that her fonner 
cn1ployer enrolled students who were ill-prepared lo con1plctc the progra1n). 
12. Sr.e id. at 46 (statement of ~ick Glakas, President, Career College A%ociation) 
("[Se\·enly percent of proprietary school sludents] arc the first in their L-unilics to attend 
college. ."). 
13. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOLJNT:\BlLJ'JY OFFICE, G.1\.0-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOl.5: 
STR01'\GER DEPARTME:\T OF EDUCArION OVERSJGHT NEEDED TO lll·:LP E;-;rsuiu: ONLY 
ELIGIBLE STUDE:\T::i RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDE\"T AID 7 (2009), available al 
http:/ /www.gao.gov/new.iteins/d09600.pdr [hereinaflcr G.AO, STRO:\·GER OVERSJGHr] 
("[O]vcr halr of the student population at proprietary schools is eon1prised or 'non-
traditional' students, such as students who are 25 years old and older."). 
14. See Linehan, supra note 7, at 756 ("!viost [proprietary school] enrollees ... have 
previously experienced educational failure."). 
15. See Anti-Fraud !iemings, suj1m note 10, at 22 (statement of Rep. 1.-Iaxinc 'Vaters) 
(arguing that victims or proprietary schools' misrepresentations "arc less likely to eon1plain, 
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Sin1ilarly, these characteristics put these individuals at higher risks of 
dropping out before progran1 con1plction and eventually defaulting on 
student loans. 1r; The costs of higher education failure arc high; therefore, 
the costs of higher education 1nisrcprcscntations arc high. Unfortunately, 
taxpaycrs 1 in addition to the victin1s, arc saddled \Vith these costs. 17 .~s a 
result, effective oversight of higher education n1arkcting and rccruitn1cnt 
\vould not only protect individual students, but also cont1ibutc to the 
country's fiscal health. 
In n1aking the case for better oversight, this 1\rticlc describes, in Part I, 
the 1nultifacctcd nature of higher education n1isrepresentations and fraud. 
Part II discusses the con1n1oditization of higher education. Part III 
chronicles the rise of proprietary colleges and describes their aggressive 
inarketing and rccruitn1cnt practices. Part IV argues that an i1npcrative 
exists for tighter regulation of higher education n1arketing and recruitn1cnt. 
Part\! asserts that current safeguards arc inadequate in protecting students 
and taxpayers fron1 n1isrcpresentations. Lastly, Part VI presents proposals 
for regulating higher education representations in a manner that protects 
the public from n1isrcprcscntations \vithout unduly restricting con1pctition 
and protected speech. 
I. HIGHER EDGCATIO:'\ MISREPRESE:'\TATIO:\!S A:'iD FRAGD 
\\Then 60 1Vfi11ules visited can1puscs of the I(atharinc Gibbs SchooJ rn and 
Brooks Collegc 1 ~1 to investigate proprietary school business practices, the 
and when they do they arc less cffccti\·c, because they don't know where to con1plain, or 
how to articulate their con1plaint, as they do not know 1hc rcquirc1nents of the law''). 
J 6. GAO, STRO'\GER O\'ERSJGHT, .rnjJm notc 13, al 19-20. 
l 7. Id. at 12 ("\Vhen students do not 1nakc pay1ncnts on their !Cdcral loans and the 
loans arc in default, the ltdcral go\·errnncn1 and taxpayers assun1e nearly all .the risk and arc 
left with the costs."). 
IH. l(atha1inc Gibbs School consisted of t\\·o ca1npuscs in l\cw York and one in 
Pennsylvania that were owned by Career Education Corporation (CEC). After an 
unsuccessful atte1npt lo sell the can1puses, CEC announced on February 15, 2008, that il 
would close one of its J(atha1inc Gibbs ran1puses and converl the other to another brand 
within its co1voration. Press Release, Career Educ. Corp., Career Education Co1voration 
Announces Plans to Teach-Out Progrctn1s at Selected Schools 1-Icld for Sale (Feb. 15, 2008), 
ht tp: / / p hx. corpora te-ir .ne l/ phoenix.zh tn11? c::: 8 7 3 90&p::: irol-
n ewsArticlc_print&JD::: 11088 l l&highligh1::: [hereinafter CEC, Teach-Out]. 
19. Brooks College consisted of two can1puses in California that were owned by CEC. 
Press Release, Career Educ. Corp., Career Education Corporation Announces Plans !Or 
Strategic J)ivcstitures of Selected Schools (No\'. 15, 2006), http://media.corporate-
ir.net/ n1cdia_files/irol/ 8 7 / 8 7390/ CECSchoo!SalcsandClosingPrcssReleasewithExhibits 11 
1506.pdf Q1creinafter CEC, Divestitures]. After an unsuccessful atte1npt to sell the 
campuses, CEC announced on June 28, 2007, that it would be closing both Brooks 
ca1npuses. CEC, Teach-Out, supra nolc 18. 
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producers found a virtual treasure trove of corruption. In its feature, For-
Prefzt Colle,_f!,e: G'ost{v Lesson) the nc•vsn1agazinc docun1cntcd recruiter 
1nisrcprcscntations and entrance cxan1 in1proprictics, providing insider 
vic,vs into the high pressure \Vorld of proprietary school rccruiting2° and the 
debilitating effects of unscrupulous rccruit1ncnt tactics.21 These tactics have 
dra\vn the ire of forn1cr students, policyn1akcrs, govcrnn1cntal regulators, 
and consurncr \Vatchdogs, and have forn1cd the bases of lav1'suits, 
investigations, and congressional hearings. Proprietary schools, for all of 
their virtues,'.!'.! have a checkered collective past. 2:-; ~rhe rate of investigations 
and sanctioning an1ong the sector exceeds that of the nonprofit sector. '.l-l-
And even though corruption has been greatly reduced since the 1980s and 
early 1990s, proprietary schools arc still tainted by in1proprieties that n1any 
believe arc the direct result of their tuition-driven, profit-generating 
niotivcs. '.ls 
20. Rebecca Leung, For-Prqjit College: Cosily Leswn, 60 I\IJNUTES, Jan. 30, 2005, 
hup:/ /\vww.cbsncws.co1n/stories/2005/0 l /31 /60n1inutcs/nu1in670'179.shunl ("The 
adn1ission counselors told 60 J\1inulc.\ they were expected to enroll three high school 
graduates a week, regardless of their ability to con1plete the coursework. And if they didn't 
meet those quotas, they were out of a job . They all say the pressure produced so1nc 
very aggressive sales tactics."). 
21. See id. (intcn·iewing uncn1ploycd and underen1ploycd g1·aduates of Brooks College 
who stated that achnission counselors induced their enrolln1enl with prmnises of prcstiglous 
n11ployn1cnt in the fashion industry upon graduation). 
22. See C.S. (;E:'\. i-\CCOL:.'\Tl:\G 0FFJCE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, PROPRIET:\RY 
SCHOOLS: :r-vf!J,LIO.\"S SPENT TO TRAL'\ STUDEi\'TS FOR OvERSL:Pl'LJED Occt:PATIONS 5 
(1997), available al hup:/ /www.gao.gov/archivc/ 1997 /he97 l 04.pdC Q1ercinaficr GAO, 
0\'ERSLPPl.JED Oc:c:L;P.--\TJO.\S] ("Proprietary schools contribute to the nation's 
cmnpetitivcncss by providing occupational training to traditionally noncollcg-c-bound 
individuals.''). 
23. See LIS:\ K_. FOSTER, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, CH.B 04-010, FoR-PROF!T 
POSTSECONDARY EDL'.C.--\TION.--\1. l:\STITLTJONS: OvER\'JEW OF 1\CCRJ·:nrr.--\TJO!\" t\J~D 
STATE AND FEDER.--\1. OVERSIGHT 14- (2004-) ("During the 1970s and 80s, institutions 
operated with little or no oversight and !Cw constraints in recruiting and training students. A 
large nun1bcr or institutions did not provide the training advertised, did not co1nply with fair 
consu1ner practices, and 1nis1nanaged finances."). 
2'1-. See Linehan, .wjna note 7, at 760 ("[A]lthough proprietary schools con1posc one-
third of the approxin1atcly 6,000 schools eligible for federal student grants and loans, they 
recently accounted for three-fourths of the Deparlinent [of Education]'s student loan fraud 
and abuse investigations."). 
25. See Catherine Elton, J)egrees q1· Djfjicully: The Tiuth About Online [Jniver.iilies, 
COXSUi\·lERS DIG., 1vlar./ Apr. 2009, at 20-21 (describing "a disturbing pattern" of 
aggressive recruiting tactics by for-profit schools that ensnare unqualified students who 
ultimately ri1il out or qualified studcnL'\ who receive little benefit fro111 the noncompetitive 
lcan1ing environment). 
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A. bfflnted Placemen! and Completion Rates 
Proprietary school misrepresentations and other in1proprictics cost 
individual students and taxpayers. l'vlisrcprcscntations typically pertain to 
job placcn1cnt rates, a bcnchn1ark upon \Vhich proprietary schools n1arkct 
thcn1sclvcs.26 These rates can be n1isrcprcscntcd in tcrn1s of the nu1nbcr of 
students placed, the average salary offered by those placcn1cnts, and the 
overall availability of quality placcn1cnts.'.!7 A._ prerequisite to placcn1cnt, 
con1plction rates arc often n1isrcprcscntccPB or not clisclosccl as rcquircd.2'1 
A con1n1011 scenario is one experienced by the 60 1'1inules producer \vho 
posed as a prospective student. She \Vas told by a I<..atharine Gibbs 
representative that the school\ placen1ent rate \Vas 89°/o; ho\vever, 
Deparnnent of Education (DOE) data put the rate at 29°;;i.:~o A forn1er 
Brooks recruiter captured the integrated nature of placc1ncnt and 
con1pletion rate misrepresentations \vhen she sun11narizecl the essential 
elcn1cnts of her deceptive sales pitch: "\'\! c arc telling you that you arc going 
to have a 95 percent [chance of getting] a job paying S35,000 to 54·0,000 a 
year by the tin1c you arc done in 18 n1011ths.":-11 Proprietary schools have 
26. See Linehan, .mjJH1 nolc 7, al 757 {discussing how prop1ictary schools place 
"advc1tisc1nents on dayli1nc and late night television lo reach the uncn1ployed and those 
seeking new jobs"); see aLw FOSTER, supra nolc 23, at 12 (describing placement rates as "[t]hc 
ultimate outcon1c 111easurc"). 
27. See 1111ti-Fra11d llearingJ, .wpm note 10, at 15 (statc111en1 or IZcp. i\Jaxinc \\';llcrs) 
("The biggest 1nisrcprcscntations n1ack lo students that con\·ince thc111 to enroll arc 
anticipated starting -.-salary ... and the place1nent rate. The starting sala1ics that 
prospecti\'c students arc told arc scldorn true. l'dany schools tout a 90°/o plus placcn1cnt 
rate. But these arc sclfrcportccl rates and not necessarily accurate."); see alw Linehan, supra 
note 7, at 759 (discussing the pressure that oversupplied labor n1arkets place on proprictar:-
schools); "C.S. GE'\. A.CCOL'.'\Tl'\G Ol'JIJCE, GAO/T-HEHS-96-JSfl, I-IJGl-!ER EnL.:c.-\TIO'\: 
E'\sL:Rl'\G QL:ALJTY EDL:CxrJO:\ FRO:\] PROPRJl·:TARY l.\ST!TLTIO.\S l l-12 (1996), 
Ll1creinaftcr GA.O, E.'\SL;Ill~G QUALITY] (statcn1ent or Cornelia l\J. Blanchette), available 111 
hup:/ /www.gao.gov/archivc/ I 996/he96 I 58L.pdf (discussing the financial ra1nifications of 
students incuniug debt in order to train IOr jobs for which little de1nand exists). But rj." 
GAO, OVERSLPPL!ED OCCUPATIONS, supra note 22, at 11 (discussing bcncfils con!Crrcd 
upon students who trained in oversupplied fields). 
28. See, e.g., Leung, supra note 20 (reporting that reprcscntali\'es from the K.atha1ine 
Gibbs School in ~cw York lied about the school's gTacluation rate). 
29. See DE.--\I'\'\E LOONIK & Jt..:L!A DEV,\J.~TH1::RY. Xxr'L CO.'\SU.\IER LAW CTR., 
i\J.--\KL.\G THE .>JU;'dBERS COt.::\T: \VHY PROPRIETARY SCHOOL PERFOR:'d.--\'\C:E DATA 
DOESN'T ADD UP AND \VHAT CA:'J BE DONE ABOl.'.T IT 27-31 (2005), available al 
ht lp: I I \V\VW. st udcn tloanborrowcrassistance. org/ uploads /Filc/ProprietarySchoolsReport . pd 
r (describing the difficulty of obtaining completion data directly frorn proprietary schools 
included in ils investigation). 
30. Leung, ;,upra note 20. 
31. A11ti-Fraudlleari11gJ,.mpm note IO, at 8-9. 
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also been accused of n1isrcprcscnting the transferability of 
progra1nn1atic content,:-;:-; and accreditation status.:H In 
shareholders of publicly-traded schools have filed la.vsuits 
n1isrcprcscntations and on1issions in annual reports and other 
disclosures. ·5.") 
B. Inappropriate Con1pensatio11 Arrangenzenfs 
[62:3 
crcdits,::i~ 
addition, 
alleging 
required 
ln1proprictics also involve the fraudulent obtaining of Title l\l financial 
aid fr1nds. ~)(i 1'his fraud tends to be systc111atic in nature and often concerns 
the manner in \vhich recruiters arc co1npcnsatccl, the process by \vhich 
students arc enrolled and n1atriculatcd, and the n1anipulation of regulatory 
safeguards. Recruiter compensation is a frequent basis of la,-vsuits against 
proprietary schools. Title IV forbids schools fron1 con1pensating rectuiters 
based solely on the nun1ber of students they induce to enroll.:~;- This ban on 
"incentive con1pensation" is intended to protect students by lessening the 
pressure on recruiters to induce enrollment at all costs.:rn The National 
32. See, e.g., ~fill v. Delta Sch. ofCon1n1e1-cc, Inc., 487 So. 2d 180, 182 (La. Ct. App. 
1986) (alie~ng a breach or contract for SC\"CTal 1nisreprescntations the school used to induce 
plaintiff to enroll, including the ability to transfer credits to other institu1ions). 
3'.~. See, e.g., Phillips Coils. of Ala., Inc. v. Lester, 622 So. 2d 308, 309 (Ala. 1993) 
(alleging that the school misrepresented the nature of its instruction). 
34. SC(', e.g., 1'dalone \" .. ~\cad. or Court Reporting, .182 ::'\.E.2d 5+, 55-5() (Ohio Ct. 
App. l 990) (suing for false clain1s of accreditation). 
35. See_, e.g., lJoug Ledcnnan,}11~:.r Orr/enc: ef Phoenix Parent lo Pr!J' S277 Jiiliion, l."<SJDE 
HIGHER ED, Jan. 17, 2008, http:/ /www.insidchighercd.corn/nc11·s/2008/0 l I 1 7 /apollo 
(discussiJJg a large dan1agcs award issued againsl the Gnivcrsity of PhoPnix f(ll" failing to 
disclose a critical Department of Education [DOE] report in a filing \\·ith the Securities and 
Exchange Con1111ission). 
36. Titk I\·' of the Higher Education Act go\·crns the provision of !Cderal financial aid 
funds Cor higher education. "fhe statute governs n1ostly need-based prognuns, such as 
Federal Pell Grants, supplcn1cntal educational opportunity grants, pay111cnts to the States 
and institutions for need-based financial aid, and other special progra1ns and prqjec1s. 20 
l:.S.C. ~ 1070(a) (2006). 
37. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(i) (2009) (requiring that ''an institution agTccs 
that ... [i]t will not provide any con1111ission, bonus, or other incentive payn1ent based 
directly or indirecily upon success in sccu1ing cnrol11ncnls or financial aid to any person or 
entity engaged in any student recruiting or adn1ission activities. ."). But ser: id. 
§ 668. l 4(b)(22)(ii) (listing exceptions to this prohibitioJJ). 
38. 11.R. I 992, 17ie Internet Equity and Education Act ef 2001: ]fearing Before lhe Suhwmm. on 
2 I st Century Competitiveness ef !lie 11 Comm. on Education and the f1.7orlforcc, l 07th Cong. 1 + (200 I) 
(staten1cnt of Lo1Tainc Lewis, IJJspector General of the United Stales), available al 
http:/ /fi>vebgate.access.gpo.gov I cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbna1ne::: I 07 _house_hcarings&docid::: 
1:77908.pdf ("The prohibition was designed lo protect students from the high pressure tactics 
used by recruiters to enroll students in progran1s for which they n1ay not have been prepared 
or did not want. "fhe students were saddled with 1rnwanted debt at increased cost to the 
Number 3 •Volume 62 •Summer 2010 •American Bar Association• Administrative Law Review 
'"Your Results May Vary': Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through 
Tighter Regulation of Proprietary Schoo! Representations" by Aaron N. Taylor, 
published in the Administrative Law Review, Volume 62, No. 3, Summer 2010. 
© 201 O by the American Bar Association. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in 
an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
20101 TIGHTER REGUIA770.YOF SCHOOL REPRESE.\-rATIO.\S 737 
l\ssociation for College Adn1ission Counseling (NACAC) argues that 
"reducing the basis for compensation to the number of students enrolled in 
any circun1stancc introduces an incentive for recruiters to actively ig11orc 
the student interest in the transition to postsecondary education. "39 In spite 
of this ban, accusations against proprietary school con1pcnsation structures 
abound:111 In a 2003 audit, the DOE found that the University of Phoenix 
(UOP)-11 had violated the ban:12 The audit described a systcn1 under 'vhich 
recruiter con1pcnsa6on \Vas tied to "asses in classcs".t:J and a culture 'vhcrc a 
recruiter's cnrolln1cnt nun1bcrs could mean the difference benveen 
lucrative en1ployn1entl--l- and uncn1ployn1ent.~.S According to the DOE, the 
high pressure cnvironn1ent fostered by UOP's con1pensation structure led 
to the very dangers that the ban is intended to prevent. Unqualified 
students and those facing unfavorable fan1ily or financial circumstances 
vvere pressured to enroll. -Hi Recruiters also pressured students to take out 
loans to pay tuition,+7 and recruiters vverc encouraged to cease providing 
taxpayers."). 
39. ::\Xr'L .A.ss'x FOR COLI .. An.\HSSJO:'\ COC?\SELING, TEST!.\IONY OF THE l'\ATIO:\"AL 
AsSOCJATJO?\ FOR COLI.EGE ADl\IJSSIO:\" COU:\"SELJXG (XACt\C): I·IJGHER EDUCATJO:\' AGr 
ST.-\TL:ToRY B.--\:\" O'.\' J:\"CENTJVE Co.\JPE:\SATION FOR An:o.HSSION A?\D F1.'\ANCl.-\L A.in 
OFFICERS 1-2 (2009), available al hup://www.nacacnet.org/Legislali\'cAction/ 
Legislati vc :'\" C\ vs/Doeun1cn ts IN A CA CT estimonyl nccnli vcC on1pensatio n. pdf [hcrcinaft er 
~ACAC "fF.STL\JO:\V] (discussing the ban in ten11s of the "infonnation asynunetrl' tha! 
exists between recruiters and prospective studtnls). 
40. See, e.g., LOO:'\I.'\ & DE\'A:\THt'.:RY, rnpm note 29, al I (sununarizing these 
accusations). 
'}l. Cnivcrsity of Phoenix (COP) is "the nation's largest piivatc uni\'trsiLy, offering 
unckrgraduatc and gTaduate degree prog1«1n1s at 1nore than 200 locations, as well as onlinc 
1n n1o~t countrlcs around the world." l'.ni,•crsity of Photnix, History, 
ht lp:/ ;,,.,v,1· .phoenix.eclu/ about_us/ about_univcrsity_o[_phoenix/ history.hl111l (last visi1 eel 
i\ug. '.), 20 l 0). 
'12. "C.S. DEr'T OF Ence., PRCX 20034-0922254, PROGR.--\).J RE\"!E\\" R1·:PORT: 
t_:_'\l\'ERSITY OF PHOE.'\lX 7-8 (2004), m.milable at http://s3.a1nazonaws.co1n/propublica/ 
asscts/highcr-cd/doe_rcport_uop.pdf Q1ereinafter "COP PROGR:\:O,.I R_E\'IE\\" REPOR"l]. 
43. 1'he audit also referenced "butts in seats." Id. at lO. 
44. See, e.g., id. al 7-8 (listing a salary schedule showing that UOP recruiters could 111akc 
upwards of $120,000 per year and discussing how the potential for high salaries often 
pro1npled en1ployccs in other departmenl~ lo seek recruiter positions). 
'}5. Id. at 12 (quoting a UOP enrolln1enl director saying in a recruiter 1nceting: "f\lly job 
is on the line. And I need you guys to perform. . . if you're not doing your job, you're going 
to lose your job. And if you're not hitting your goals, that's how we're going to measure if 
you're doing the job. And ... I don't inean applications in. I mean starts."). 
4-6. Even when recruiters felt other educational options, such as eom1nunity collcg-cs, 
would be better for individual prospects, they were forbidden from 1naking such 
rccon11nendations. Id. at 24. 
47. Recruiters were expected to eon1plete financial aid documentation for students, and 
the forging of signatures by recruiters was commonplace. Id. al 25; see afro Anti-Fraud 
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support to these students once their enrollment \vas credited for salary 
purposcs.-rn UOP ended up paying $9.8 n1illion to settle the investigation 
but ad111ittcd no \vrongcloing.-l-'1 
The issue of incentive con1pcnsation has spa\vncd a spate of}a,vsuits filed 
pursuant to the federal False Clain1s f\ct (.l<""CA).-"'O The qui tani-"'1 pro\isions 
of the Act pcrn1it p1i\'atc citizens to bring la\vsuits alleging ffaud against the 
govcrn111cnt on behalf of the govcrnn1cnt .. 'i'! If the plaintif1S, referred to as 
rclators, arc successful in \Vinning dan1agcs on behalf of the govcrnn1cnt, 
they share in the rccO\'cry.·1:l The la\v is intended to inccntivizc \Vhistlc-
blo-,ving by indi,iduals \Vith first-hand kno\vledgc of fraud against the 
govcn1n1ent.·1·1 Proprietary schools arc particularly susceptible to FCi\ 
lleari11gs, j1tpm note 10, at 41 {sta1c1ncnt of Paula L. Dorsey, forn1er J)ircctor of Admissions, 
Bryn1an College) (discussing recruiters pressuring students to "in1properly obtain social 
security nun1bers and signatures of other !~u11ily 1nen1bers by whatever 1neans necessary for 
the hopes of getting a 'bcucr' financial aid package"). 
48. See t:Qp PROGRA.\I RE\"JE\\' REPORT, .rnj;ra nolc ,J.2, at 24 (illustrating how, to be 
considered enrolled for pu1voscs or calculating recruiter sala1y, sttidents had to ''attend three 
nights of the first five-week course of" a bachelors' prograin or, for gTacluate students, au end 
two nights ... and be scheduled to attend a second class. After the student has n1et these 
ciitcria ... LOP requires [recruiters] to pursue new cnroJbnenls .... "). 
49. See Apollo Group, Inc., The February 2004 Prognun Review Report R.clating to 
the University of Phoenix was fundainentally Flawed, http:/ /www.apollolegal.cozn/ 
prrCritiquc.htn1! (last visited .July 31, 2010) i''[\\]c l>dicvc thal the tcrn1s of the Scttlc1ncnt 
.-\grcen1ent between GOP and [the DO El constitute a clear, albeit iznplicil, njcction of the 
[audit] and its alleged findings. The si1npk fact is that if the alleged findings in the [audit] 
had any 111erit-which they do not-[thc IJ()E] would not and could not ha\"C settled the 
issues raised in the [audit] on the tcnns that it did. The 1ern1s of the Seulc1nc11t Agrec1nent 
arc very fa,·orabk: to l'.OP."). 
JO. See, e.g., l~in1othy J. Hatch & Bryan Arnold, 77ze Growing "Threat ef False-Claim.\ 
Luu.mils, CHRO.\. HIGHER EnL:c. .July 14, 2006, at BIG, rwailah!e at 
http:/ /chronicle.con1/artide/Thc-Gro,,·ing-Thrca1-o('..Falsc/ I 0310/ (desnibing a recent 
Sc\"Cnth Circuit decision allowing a plaintiff to bring a clai1n under the False Clain1s A.ct 
(FCA) against a pri\'ate school). 
51. "Qi.ti lam is short f(ir the Latin phrase . . ·who pursues this action on our Lord the 
K.ing's behalf as well as his own."' \'t. Agcnc~ of :'\atura] Res. \'. Cnitcd States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 V.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000). 
52. 31 L'.S.C. ~ 3730(b)(l) (2006) ("A. person n1ay b1ing a civil action for a violation or 
section 3729 for the person and for the l~nitecl States Governn1cnt. The action shall be 
brought in the name of the Governn1enL."). 
53. Defendants found to ha\"C con1n1itted fraud under the FCA arc assessed a fine 
ranging from $5,000 lo $10,000 and n1usl pay three 1in1es the govenunent\ da1nagcs arising 
fron1 the fraud. § 3729{a)(7). Plaintiffs can reco\'er between 2.5°10 and 30°10 of the laucr 
assess1nent. Id.§ 3730(d){2). 
34·. See, e.g., Constitutionality of the Qui Ta1n Provisions of the False Clai1ns Act, 109 
Op. Alt'y Gen. 4~5 (1989) (staling that the 1986 i\1nend1ncnts to the FCA were the result of 
Congress being "dissatisfied with the way the cxecuti\'e branch was enforcing govcn11nent 
procurcn1cnt laws" and therefore desiring to "'deputize' private citizens to ensure effective 
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Ja,vsuits; 33 plaintiff<> have filed n1any Ja,vsuits allcglng fraud in the 
obtainn1cnt of 'l'itlc IV funds, prin1arily ansing fron1 recruiter 
con1pcnsation arrangcn1cnts. 5li FCA actions of this type have proved 
fi·uitful. In 2007, Oakland City University paid $5.3 n1illion to settle such a 
la\vsuit.57 In late 2009, UOP settled an FCA suit for aln1ost $80 million.·?8 
In both cases, the \vhistlc-blo1vcrs rcccivccl n1illions of dollars for their 
efforts. 
C. Entrance 1fsL ln1/1roprieties 
Proprietary schools have also faced accusations of in1proprictics relating 
to the cnrolln1cnt of ineligible students for financial aid purposes. Entrance 
test in1proprictics and the falsification of attendance records commonly 
forn1 the bases of these accusations. For federal financial aid pu1poses, 
students not possessing a high school diplon1a or General Equivalency 
Diploma (GED) nlust take and pass "an independently acln1inistcrcd test of 
basic n1ath and English skills, called an 'ability-to-benefit' or A TB test. The 
intent of the test is to measure \Vhethcr students have the basic skills needed 
to benefit fron1 higher education and succeed in school. ".J~l An investigation 
by the Governn1ent Accountability Office (GAO) clocun1ented test 
adn1inistrators giving out ans,vers and changing ans,vers to ensure passing 
scores. 60 At the }Catharine Gibbs School, the 60 ;\!Jinuies producer 
intentionally failed the entrance exan1, but \·Vas allovvcd to retake it and vvas 
told her second score \vas sufficient for adn1ission purposes_(il Additionally, 
law cnforccn1c11t''). 
55. See Sara Hebel, Sujitnne Comt Blocks Suill .·lgaim·/ P11bfir Colleges [.'J1der c:s. T+71frtle-
Blower l..i1W, CHROX. I·JJGHt~R Enl;c., June 2, 2000, at A'.18, auaiiabie al 
http:/ /chroniclc.c01n/articlc/Supre1nc-Court-Blocks-S11its-/35 l 30/ (detailing ho\v pr:iYa!c 
individuals arc barred fron1 suing public, bu1 not private, colleges). 
56. See genna!fr I-latch & Arnold, .wpm note 50, at B 16 (providing an overview or FCA 
lawsuits brought against educational institutions). 
57. Elizabeth Quill, [J11iz,,0;1i!J• H'ill P(!Y S5.3-J1iilion lo ,)'ettle f.Vlu:>tfe-Blowcr'!J Lt1ws11it, 
CHRO~. HIGHER Ent:C., Aug. 40, 2007, at A20, available al 
http: I I chronicle. con1 I article /lJ ni \ -crsi t y-\Viii-Pa y-5 3-JVIi/ 5144 /. 
58. Press Release, Apollo Group, Inc., Apollo Group, Inc. Resolves lJnivcrsity of 
Phoenix False Clain1s Acl Case (Dec. 14, 2009), http:/ /plLx.cOI'f)Oratc-
ir.net/phocnix.zhtn11?c:::79624&p:::irol-newsA.rlicle&ID::: 1365655 ("lJndcr the teims of the 
agrce1nent, lhc Co111pany will pay $67 .5 1nillion to the United Stales. A separatc agree1nenl 
provides for the payinenl by the Co1npany of$J l 1nillion in altorncys fees to the plaintiffa, as 
required by the False Clai1ns Act."). 
59. Gf\0, STRONGER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, al 9. 
60. Id. al 22. 
61. Her initial score was seven oul of fifty. Upon retaking the test, the admissions 
recruiter said she got fourteen out or fifty answers correct, which was sufficient for 
enrollment. Leung, supra note 20. 
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recruiters alleged that schools forced thcn1 to enroll students even \Vithout 
required exam scorcs.(;2 J\ federal raid in 2004 of the headquarters of ITT 
Educational Services (ITT)<i:l and ten of its can1puscs is believed to have 
been related to allegations that the proprictaiy educational provider \vas 
overstating student cnrolln1cnt in order to increase its federal financial aid 
rcvcnuc.G-l- The investigation found no \vrongcloing an1ong executives 
\vithin the con1pany;(i5 ho\vcvcT, investigations of individual can1puscs 
rcn1aincd opcn. 1ifi 
D. C'o/wrt DrjO.uli Rate j_\1a1u/JulaLion 
Schools arc con1n1only accused of n1anipulating cohort default ratcs.i.1 
Cohort default rates provide schools ,.vith incentives to 111inin1izc defaults 
62. See Anti-Fraud llearing!J, .\llpra note I 0, al 'ii (slaten1enL of Paula L. Dorsey, forn1cT 
Director of A.dn1issions, Bry1nan College) (''There were students that had never taken the 
exains or who had Jailed the exan1s, sining in class. I was instructed to dean up the !ilcs by 
whatever 1neans necessary even if it nleanl backdating things."). 
63. Sec ITT Educational Services, Inc., Investor Relations Overview, 
hllp: I /,vww .iucsi.con1/phoenix.zhtn11?c::::94519&p::::irol-IRI-lo1ne ("ITT Education a! 
Services, Inc. ... provides accredited, technology-or:ientcd undergraduate and gTadualc 
degree progra1ns ... to help students develop skills and knowledge they need to pursue 
career opportunities in a variety of fields. It owns and operates n1orc· than I 20 ITT 
Technical Institutes and Daniel \Vcbster College. [ltj serves approxi111atcly B0,000 students 
at ils can1puses in 38 states and online."). 
64. &~c Press Release, IT'T Educational Scrvices, Inc., 1Tf Educational Services, Inc. 
Reports that It Has Been Served with a SC'arch \Varranl and IZdatcd Subpoenas fro1n the 
t:.S. District Court 111 Texas (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.ittcsi.con1/ 
phoenix.zhln1l?c::::94519&p::::irol-nc\vsA.rtick&ID::::,J.9fl922&highlight:::: (reporting Lhal 
agents sought infonnation pertaining to "phtcen1ent figures and rates, retention figt11Ts and 
rates, graduation figures and rates, attendance figures and rates, rccrui11ncnt and adn1issions 
rnalerials, student grades, graduate salaries[,] and transferability or credits 10 other 
institutjons''). 
65. Press R.clease, ITI' Educational Services, Inc., IT1' Educational Scn·ices, Inc. :'\o 
Longer Sul~ject of L'.S. Dcpart111cnl of .Justice ln\'cstigation LJunc 21J., 2005), 
http:/ I www .ittesi.con1/ phoenix:,:htn11?c::::94-:l l 9&p:::irol-news1\rtide&JD:::: 7237 75 
&highlight::::; sec alro LeLter fro1n Chuck Rosenberg, t:.S. Attorney, to 1'hon1as E. Holliday & 
Lawrence D. Finder LJunc 24, 2005), hup://1nedia.c01voratc-
ir.net/1nedia_lilcs/I\I'"S/ESI/DOJLet.pdf (inConning counsel !Or ITT that the L".S. 
J-\.ttorney's investigation "has not revealed evidence sufficient" lo find wrongdoing on the 
parts of con1pany executives). 
66. John L. Pulley, Justice Dejxirlment Ends lnqnio' into !IT Educational Sernices, CHRO:\. 
HIGHER EDUC., July 8, 2005, at A23, available al http://chronicle.co1n/artide/Justice-
DeparL111ent-Ends-Inq/7707 /. 
67. See GAO, STRONGER OVERSJGHT, :.upra note 13, at JO ("[DOE] con1putes default 
rates for all schools with students who receive Title IV loans ... by tracking whether 
borrowers in a cohort-a group of students who begin repaying their loans in a given fiscaJ 
year-at each school default on their federal student loans over a 2-year period."). 
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an1ong their stuclcnt-borro\vcrs and protect taxpayers fron1 the costs of 
excessive dcfaults. 6!l Schools \·vith default rates that exceed certain 
thresholds can have their federal financial aid eligibility stripped. G•) 
I-Iistorically, proprietary schools have recorded higher default rates than 
nonprofit institutions, 70 and nun1crous proprietary schools have been closed 
due to unacceptably high ratcs. 71 Given the extent to \\'hich proprietary 
schools rely on 'I'itlc l\l aid, losing eligibility is akin to an institutional death 
sentence. I'!. 
In an effort to reduce cohort default rates, son1c prop1ictary schools 
unilaterally pay off loans obtained by students \vho later \vithdn1,v. 7:l \.Vhile 
this niay seen1 altruistic on its face, the true n1otivation is thus: Students 
\vho take out loans to pay for school 1 but \Yithclra\v before co1nplcting an 
acaden1ic progran1 1 arc at high risk of defaulting on those loans;7-t therefore, 
schools settle the loans for these students as a n1cans of protecting their 
Title IV eligibilit)1 fron1 likely defaults. 7:1 The schools then engage in 
aggressive efforts to collect the debt fron1 students, offering less favorable 
repayment tern1s than those available through Title IV. 7fi As a result1 
forn1er students have brought la\vsuits alleging contract-based causes of 
action.77 
68. ''Defaulted kderal student loans cosl l<L"Xpayers 111oney. Cohort default rate 
sanctions and benefits proyicJe an inccnti\'c to schools to work with their borrowers to reduce 
dcfauh. [C]ohon default rates help sa\'C ta .... paycrs n1oncy." C.S. DEP'T OF EnL:c. 
COHORT DEFA.Ll,'J" Rxn: GL:JDE, 2.4-1 (2006), hllp://iLlp.cd.go,·/Dcfauhl\1anagcn1t'nt/ 
guidc/at1achnwnts/CDRGuicle:l\JasterSept06.pdC 
69. Schools with dcfallh ralcs of 25°/o or abo\·c for thi:ee years or abo\'e '1-0°/o for one 
year lose kckral student loan eligibility /Or the rcn1aindcr of the year after notification and 
for the subsequent two years. pending appeals and af\jllsl1ncnts. See id. at 2.4-2 to -3 
(discussing benefits con!"Crrcd upon schools with default rates ofkss than 5°/o or 10°/n). 
70. G:\O, STRO>:GER ()\"l·J(S!GHT, supra note 13, al l '.1, I 5- I 7. 
71. Sa, 1'.g., Linehan, .rn/Hr1 nole 7, at 760 (noting that the closures have resulted fro1n 
"fraudulent inisreprcscntations and deceptive 1narketing''). 
72. Id. But Jee Justin Pope, AP L\IPACT· For-Prqjit Colf1g1's Boos! Lending, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Aug.14, 2009. auailab/e at http://abcnews.go.co1n/CS/wircStory?icl:::833000 I 
(detailing increased loan inaking by prop1ictary schools to financially strapped students, 
111any of who1n would not quali!\· for traditional student loans). 
73. Sre, e.g., Doug Ledennan, l/1111.rna/ (and lmprope1) l'Vfi)' to !.JJwer f)ef(w!t Raffj, l>:SJDE 
l-l!Gl·IER ED, 1viay 21, 2008, hup:/ /www.insidchighered.co111/layout/sct/print 
/news/2008/05/21 I default (discussing the particularities of TIT's lending practices and 
their negative i1npact on students). 
74. See, e.g., GAO, STRO>:GER 0\'ERSJGHT, .wpm note 13, at 20 (providing an overview 
of six dilTercnt research studies that showcase trends in students' default rates). 
7 5. Ledern1an, supra note 7'.1. 
76. Id. 
77. See ~A.CAC TESTL\!O~Y, .mpm note 39, at !6 (sununarizing a lawsuit against lJOP 
filed by fonncr students whose loans were paid by lJOP without their pern1ission). 
Number 3 •Volume 62 •Summer 2010 •American Bar Association· Administrative Law Review 
"'Your Results May Vary': Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through 
Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations" by Aaron N. Taylor, 
published in the Administrative Law Review, Volume 62, No. 3, Summer 2010. 
© 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in 
an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
742 ADJI1\'7STR'I T/IE, L,1J1: l?ET7Ff 1: 162:3 
The DOE has expressed disapproval of this behavior. In 2008, an 
inspector for the DOE found that a proprietary school in Nc\v York had 
in1propcrly repaid Title IV loans or returned loan funds for 30 l students 
\vho \YithdrC\\' during their first scn1cstcr of study. 7B School officials stated 
that this "default prevention polic~/' \Vas in1plc1ncntcd due to past problcn1s 
\vith the school's default rate. 7 ~1 As a result of its findings, the DOE n1aclc 
various rccon1n1cndations to the school, including ceasing the practice of 
repaying loans and ending pending collection efforts resulting fron1 that 
practice.Ho 
Proprietary school misrepresentations and i1nproprictics arc n1ultifacctcd 
and costly. I-Jo,vcvcr, for 111any of these institutions, their profit-generating 
n1otives n1ake the allure of such beha,~ors irresistible. These n1otivcs arc 
part of a larger trend of con1n1o<litization of higher education. 
Con1n1oditization has introduced a n1arkct ethos into higher education that 
has changed the \Vay all institutions operate-for better and \Vorse. 
II. THE COMMODITIZATIO'; OF HIGHER Em;cATJON 
The United States has the 1nost market-oriented systen1 of higher 
education in the \vorld.H 1 Con1parcc\ to its European counterparts, the 
A1nerican systen1 has developed \vith little direct influence from the federal 
governn1ent. B2 This frcedon1 has spa\.vned a vast, entrepreneurial 
expansion of higher education \.vi thin the United Statcs.B.1 '"'fhrough 111uch 
of the country's history, new colleges vvere established '\vithout restraint,"84 
and the result has been a proliferation and clen1ocratization of higher 
78. l_;.s. Dl·:P'T OF EDl_:c ., OFFICE 01' l\Sf'ECTOR GE\"., ED-OIG/A02H0007, Fl:'\AL 
At:DIT REPORT: TECH:'\'JC:\L CAREER l\"STlTl""rt~S, l.\'C.'S AD,\!l~JSTR:\TIO'\ OF THE 
FEDERAL PELL (;R.-\\"T A'.\'D fEDER.-\L f.-\,\llL'li EDL:CATIO:'\ LOA\" PROGRA:.JS '.i (2008). 
hup:/ /\-V\vw2 .ed. go\·/ about/ offices/list/ oig/ auditreports/ fy200B/ a02h0007 .pdf. 
79. Id. at 4-. 
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., J);;n·id D. Dill, Ailmving the 1'1aiket to Rule: 17ie Cme q/lhe United Stales. 57 
HIGHER EDCC. Q !36, 137 (2003) (discussing the increased "1narketization" of higher 
education and its i1npact 011 the public interest). 
82. See, e.g., 1viartin Trow, Federalism in Ameri(an Iligher Education, in HIGHER LEAR!\I\"G 
IN A\IERlCA: l 980-2000 39, 39 (Arthur Levine ed., 1993) (observing the n1ini1nal direct 
influence of the kdcral govern1nent on the United States' higher education syslen1). But see, 
e.g., Lawrence E. Gladicux &Jacqueline E. King, 171e Federal Gouernmenl And lligher Ed11calio11, 
in A\IERIC.Ac"i HIGHER EDUC.-\TIO;\ I;\ THE T\.\'ENTY-Fm . .s-r CENTURY 151, 15! (Philip G. 
A.ltbach, Robert 0. Berdahl & Patricia J. Gun1port eds., 1999) (arguing that federal 
influence has been pe1vasive). 
83. See, e.g., CHRISTOPl-IERj. LUCAS, Ai\IERICAN HJGHER EDUCATION 116~ 19 (2006) 
(discussing lhe proliferation of colleges in the early Lo 1nid-ninetcenlh century United Stales). 
811-. Id. at 117. 
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education that stand in contrast to the elitist systcn1s in Europe and other 
parts of the \vorld. 8·1 Historically, ho,vcvcr, the higher education n1arkct 
has been largely protected fron1 the sink-or-s\vin1 pressures that have 
characterized other industries. I-Iighcr education has enjoyed strong public 
support, and vast sun1s of public resources have flovvcd \Vith '~rtually no 
strings attachccl.86 Ho,vcvcr, various cconon1ic and social trends have led 
to a clin1inishn1cnt of higher education's protected n1arkct standing, and as 
a result, a capitalistic acadcn1ic systcn1 has conic to the f0rc.H1 
1~hc con1n1oditization of higher education is a transcendent 
phenomenon. This n1ultifaceted trend is the result of n1any interrelated 
factors, including de111ands of the kno\vledgc-based econon1y, ne\v 
technologies, increased globalization, ncoliberal financial aid policies, 
changing student populations, rising tuition, clen1ands for accountability, 
and the advent of ne\v higher education pro\.iclcrs. One result of 
con1111oditization is a higher education n1arkct rooted in capitalistic 
principles; thus, any discussion of the factors contributing to 
comn1oclitization n1ust begin \vith a discussion of acadcn1ic capitalisn1. 
Like capitalisn1 in general, acadcn1ic capitalisn1 is about con1pctition-
con1pctition for funding, students, and-for son1c schools-prestige. !m The 
prima1y con1pctitors arc institutions, vvhich arc en1boclied by the actors \vho 
operate therein: faculty, students, and adn1inistrators.B~J Net\.vorks arc 
central to viability \·\~thin the acaclcn1ic capitalist systen1.!111 As such, 
institutional actors seek to link institutions (and thcn1sclves) to the n1odern, 
knovvlcdge-based cconon1y.!ll These links n1ost often take the forn1 of"nc\v 
circuits ofknovvleclgc"-partnerships \vith the private sector, invcstn1cnts in 
marketing, product dcvclopn1cnt and student services, and an expanded 
1nanagerial core to handle these nevv dcn1ands.~12 Funclan1cntally, the goal 
85. See id. al I 08 (arguing lhal republican ideals in the young nation's history 
cont1ibuled lo liberalization of higher education in the Lnitcd States). 
86. See, e.g., Trow, s11j1m note 82, at 57 (calling the federal go\Trnincnt's approach to 
disbursing land grants under the lvlorrill Acts "extraordinarily pennissi\-c''). 
87. See DAVID L. KJRP, SI·IAKESPEr\RE, El:\STE!i'\, AND THE BOTl'O.\·I L!.'\E: THI~ 
l'dARKETJNG OF H1c~1-JER EDCCATJON 2 (2003) ("For better or worse-for bcucr mu/ worse, 
really-1\n1erican higher education is being lransfonncd by both lhe power and the ethic of 
the n1arketplacc."). 
88. See, e.g., SHEIL.\ SL.'\UGHTFR & GARY H.HOADES, Ac.--\DL\JIC CAPITALIS.\I A .. '\\D THE 
NE\V ECONOi'l'IY: 1\ifARKETS, STATE, .>\!"\JD HIGHER EDUCATIO!'\ I {200'1). 
89. Id. 
90. See id. al 24 (providing examples of organizations and networks that act as 
intem1ediaries between the public and private sectors). 
91. Id. at l. 
92. Id. 
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of institutions competing in this cnvironn1cnt is to generate incon1c,~n 
particularly fron1 "alternative revenue strcan1s/'9-I \vith the assun1ption that 
robust, diversified funding vvill lcad to gTcatcr prestige, better students, and 
increased viability. 9.'i 
.A. li.lwu)ledge-Based Ec01wnIV 
In a knO\\'icclgc-bascd cconon1y, kna\;,.'lcdgc is a con1n1odity that \vhcn 
exploited can reap tangible benefits upon the posscssor.!lli I-Iighcr education 
institutions arc central to the ki10\vlcdgc-basccl cconon1y because they arc 
considered "a 1najor source of alienable kno\vlcdgc. "!17 In other \Vorcls, as 
creators, holders, and sellers of kno\vlcdgc, these institutions hold the key to 
cconon1ic gro\vth and the social cohesion that often accon1panies such 
gTovvth."B As a result, one of the n1ost pressing issues concerning the nature 
and function of higher education is ho\v it can ensure that citizens can be 
productive participants \Vithin this cconon1y.~l!l And just like the ki10\vledgc-
bascd cconon1y facilitates opportunity and success for possessors of vital 
kno\vlcdgc, it "increasingly eliminates those \Vithout education and training 
beyond high school fron1 employment opportunities that can support a 
n1iddlc-class standard ofliving." 10o 
The relatively nc\v cn1phasis on knovvlcclgc as a tool of cconon1ic vitality 
has created a n1arket for education and has changed the n1otivations and 
9'.1. See id. at 11 (defining acade1nic capilalis1n as ''the pursuit of1narket and n1arkc1Iikc 
[sic] activities [by colleges and uni\·crsitics] lo generate external l'C\'Cnucs"). 
911-. Ste.}.--\.\!ES C. HEAR>:, A.\J. CoL:.'\CJJ. O:\' EDL:c., D!\'ERSIF\'I.\G CA.\JPLS RE\'EXL'E 
STRE.-\.\lS: Oi'!'ORTL'.\JTJES .--\.'\D RISKS l (2003) (idcntil\'ing ''allcn1ative rc\·enuc strea1ns" as 
those fron1 sources other than stale appropriations or tuilion and (ces). 
95. (j: id. at 5 (staling lhat instilulions arc being !(weed "to seek acJditiOnaJ rc\·enuc 
sources" to tl1CCl lhe clcn1ands of "increased expectations" and the threats of "new pro\·idcrs 
a11d 1cd1nologic~"). 
96. See SL--\LGHTER & RHOADES, .wpm note flfl, at 15 ("[I(]nowlcdgc is a raw n1atc1ial 
to be converted to products, processes, or service."). 
97. Id. 
98. ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPER.·\TIUN & DEV., EDLCATIO!\' POLICY A.\A!.YSIS: FOcl:s 
O.'\ H1ca-1ER EDL:cxno>:; 2005-200612 (2006) Ll1creinaftcr OECD Pol.ICY A\'ALYS!S]. 
99. S('e PATRICK i'vI. C:\LL--\.c"\' ET.--\!.., THE Nxr'L CTR. FOR Pun. POLICY & 1--:IJGHER 
EnL:c., Goon Pouc:Y, Goon PRACTJCE: L\.!!'RO\'l;\'G OurcO.\IES Al"\'D PRODUCTJ\'J'JY ].'\ 
HIGHER EDL:C:\'rIO.\"; A GL:JDE FOR POLICY:\l:\KERS l (2007), 
http:/ I \Vww .highereducalion .org/ reports/Policy _Practice/ind ex.sh tnll (asserting that 
opporluni!ics for higher education arc not "as widespread as they need lo be lo place 
Americans in good jobs, fuel econon1ic growth, pro1nolc social mobility and social justice, 
and sustain the country's den1ocratic ideals"). 
100. THE l\AT'L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY & HIGHER EDUC., 1vfEASURING lJP 2006: THE 
.:\1.--\TIO.'\.--\L REPORT CARD O:\' HIGHER EDUCATION 20 (2006), 
http://n1easuringup.highereducalion.org/ _docs/2006/f\.TalionalRcport_2006.pd( 
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n1inclscts of students. Students arc increasingly \riC\ving education as a 
product and thcn1sclvcs as consun1crs. 101 t\cadcn1ic capitalisn1 dictates that 
" [ s] tu dent consu1ncrs choose ... colleges and univcrs1t1cs that they 
calculate arc likely to bring a return on educational invcstn1cnt."Io2 The 
traditional student n1otivation-lcarning for learning's sake-is n1aking 
\vay for contcn1porary realities and pressures \vhcrc education is 
increasingly seen as a private, rather than public, goocl. 103 Therefore, as 
the \'aluc of a college education has skyrockctccl, io-t schools ha\T been 
increasingly required to "rcfra1nc thcn1sclvcs as both education and business 
institutions." 105 
B. ,,.\,.ew Technologies 
'rechnology has changed "ho\v students learn, ho\V professors teach and 
conduct research, and ho\v adn1inistrators n1anage institutions." 11 Hl Today, 
111any schools offer courses via distance learning fran1e\vorks. Professors arc 
nO\V able to analyze large datasets in seeking kno,vledge and arc able to 
collaborate \Vith colleagues fron1 all over the \<vorld. 107 1~cchnology's 
practical effect \vithin the academic capitalist systen1 has been to \·viclen 
learning options for students and to increase con1pctition an1ong 
101. See, e.g., SL.\l.:GHTER & RHOADES, supra note 88, at 12 ("[R]aising ttiition ... has 
hcigbLenecl students' and parents' eonsun1er consciousness about what they expect in tcrn1s 
or their cducatioual experience. These changed expectations reshape student identity 
fron1 that of learner to that 0Cconsu1ner."). 
102. Id. a! l---2 (discussing how students "increasingly choose 1n~jors linked to the nc\\' 
ccono1ny, such as business, con1nnrnications, [and] 1ncdia arts"). 
10'.·). See, e.g., id. at 42· .. 43 ("By the 1980s and 1990s, higher education was collstrued less 
as a nc:cessary public or social good and n1orc as an individual or p1ivatc good, justi()ring 
·u5cr pays· politic.~.") (citation oinittcd). 
IO·L THU.\L\Sj. K.A:\"E, THE PRJC:E OF A.D.\.JISSJO.\": RETl-l!.\"K!.\"G Ho\\· A.\ll~RICA.:"\"S P . .\Y 
FOR COLLEGE I {1999) (notjng that the difference in earnings between a high school 
gradua1c and a college graduate incrca5ed fi-0111 19°/o in 1980 to 52°/o in 199.'J). But see 
fd!CHAEL S. i\ICPHERSO.\" & J'v!ORTOi\ 0\VE:\ SCH . .\PIRO, THE STLiDEX!" A.ID GA.\IE: 
lVIEETl.\"G ::\EED ASD Rt-:\\'ARDJNG 1~ALE:\'T l.\" t\.\JERlCA.J'\ HIGHER EDL:CAT!Oi\ 40 (199/l) 
(arguing that n1uch or the increased eeonornic di!Tercntiation between lc\'cls or education is 
inostly attributable to a decline in the value or a high school education, rather than an 
increase in the value of a college education). 
105. Eric J. A.nctil, Selling !iig!1er Educalion: i.\1mkeling and AdvertL1ing America's Colleges and 
[iniversitin 3, in 34 A.SI-IE HIGHER EDUC. REPORT (J(clly 'Vard cl al. eds., 2008). 
I 06. Patticia J. Gun1port & Barbara Spo111, l1L>lilutional Ada/Jtalion: Demands 1'0r 
il1mwgemenl Reform and [lniIJeniry Adminislration, in 14· HIGHER EnL:CATIO!\·: 1-IA.!~DBOOK OF 
THEORY :\."\D RESEARCH 103, 109 Gohn C. Smart & \Villian1 G. Tic111cy eels., 1999). 
107. See OECD POLICY A~ALYSJS, supra note 98, at 18 (describing the in1pact of new 
digital technologies on higher education). 
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institutions for both students and faculty n1cn1bcrs. 11 m 'l'cchnology has also 
led to greater institutional operating cfficicncics, 10'1 a trend that has allo\vccl 
some institutions to better harness the acadcn1ic capitalist systcn1 to their 
advantagc. 1111 
G: Globalization 
Broadly, globalization is "the flo\v of technology, cconon1y, kno,vlcdgc, 
people, valucsLJ and ideas ... across bordcrs." 111 The phcnon1cnon 
cncon1passcs virtually all aspects of 1nodcrn society, and the extent to \vhich 
nations cn1bracc it varics. 112 As the \vorld's ccono111ics have bccon1c 
increasingly kno\vlcdgc-bascd and integrated, dcn1ands for globalizcd trade 
in higher education have bccon1c n1orc vocal. 11 :l This trade cn1boclics 
acadcn1ic capitalis111, as it "attract[sJ foreig11 capital, invit[cs] competition, 
and produc[cs] a profit." 11 ·1 The globalizcd trade in higher education 
involves millions of people 1 !5 and billions of dollars. 11 1i 
108. l'darvin \V. Peterson & David D. Dill, [,cndenla11di11g Ifie Competitive Envimnment efthe 
Poslsecondal)' !Gwwltdge !ndusll)', in PL..\N.\"!.\"G A.:\D 1VL\.\"AGE.\IE.\"T FOR A CHA.'\GL\'G 
E:--'\'lllO:\":'dE.\"T: A J-JA.\"DBOoK O.\" REDESJG:'\J.'\G PosTSECO.\"D:\JlY l.\"STITL:·no.'\s 3, 13-25 
(1997). 
109. Ser, e.g., CAROL:-\. 'f\\'lGG, THE .:\ . ..\T'L C·1 R. FOR Pt:n. POLICY & HIGHER EnL:c. 
CoLm.SE REDl~SIG:\ I.\l!'ROVF-S LE.-\R.\"l.\"C A\"D REDLCES COST l (2005), available al 
http://ww\v.highcreduca1ion.org/reports/pa_corc/corc.pdf (discussing a technology-based 
course redesign pn~jcct that reduced the costs of offering 1hesc courses by an average of 37°/o 
/Or the participants). 
110. See gnwmfb· RJCHARD S. Rt'CH, HIGHER ED, l.\"C.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT 
l;.\"J\"ERSIT\" (2001) (discussing the elli::ct of proprietary schools' close altention lo 
opcration:al ellicicncics). 
l 11. t_:;\"JTED XATIO.\"S EDt:C., SCIE:\T!FIC & CL:LTL:R . ..\L 0Rc;., 1-IIUHER EDUCATJO:\ !:\ 
A Gt.OB...\L!ZED SOCIETY G (200'1), http:/ /uncsdoc.unesco.org/inu1gcs/OO I '.{/001362/ 
l 3621J.7e.pdf [hcreina!ier L'XESCO, Gl.Of"l.-\LIZJ~D Socn:·1y] (quo talion on1iued). 
112. See id. ("Globalization afTects each country in a clifTl·rcnt way due to each nation's 
individual history, lradilions, cultures, resources[,] and priorities.") (quotation oinittcd). 
113. See OECD POLICY A:'\ . ..\LYSIS, supra note 98, at 103 ("'fherc is growing interest in 
ways to build cun1ulali\"C knowlcclgc across the profr·ssion .... "). 
114. N.\1. \1ARGHESE, C.\'J'J"ED ?\ATIO.\"S EDL:C., SCIE.\"TlFIC & CCLTLJRAL 0RG., 
GLOBt\LJZATJO.!\ OF HIGHER EDUC . ..\TIO:\ . ..\.\"D CROSS-BORDER STl.'.DE:\T i\:IOBILITY 9 
(2008), http://www.uncsco.org/iiep/PDF /pubs/2008/ Globalizalion_lJE.pdf. 
11.'i See 1d. at 11 1·'In 2006, there were 2.7 1nillion studenls sludying 
abroad. [P]rqjcctions ... indicate that the clcn1and ... will increase to 7.2 1nil!ion by 
2025."). 
116. See "C.\"JTED XATJO:\S Ence., SC!E.\"TJFIC & Ct:LTL:R.-\L ORG., lvIEET!:\'G OF H!GHER 
EDUCATJO!'\ PARTNERS: SY.\"THESIS REPORT O:\" TRE:\"DS :\!'<D DEVELOP:\lE:\TS JN HIGHER 
Eoucxno.\' SINCE THE \VORLD CONFERENCE o~ HIGHER EDUCATION (1998-2003) 23 
(2003), http:/ /portal.uncsco.org/ cducation/cn/filcs/20031/l056141748 lsynlhcsis_rcporl 
.pdf/synthesis_report.pdf (csti111ating that in 2003 proprietary education generated $365 
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Unsurprisingly1 the principle n1oti\·ation behind higher education 
globalization is ccono1nic. 117 Individuals possessing foreign credentials can 
broaden cn1ployn1cnt prospects and dcn1and higher salaries. 1 Ill Institutions 
can generate large sun1s of revenue by attracting foreign studcnts. 11 ~1 
Govcrnn1cnts can exploit the globalizcd kno,vlcdgc of their vvorkforcc in 
dealings \vith foreign countcrparts.1211 In response, the 'Vorld Trade 
Organization forn1ally con1111oditizccl education under the General 
i\grccn1cnt on Trade in Services (GATS) in J 995. 121 Under Gi-\'J'S, 
education trade cncon1passcs cross-border supply and consun1ption, as \Vell 
as the presence of com1nercial providers in foreig11 countrics. 122 
Technology is the pnn1ary facilitator of globalization; as such, 
globalization has had n1any of the san1c effects on higher education as 
technology. Learning opportunities have been broadened, as have 
opportunities for acadcn1ic collaboration. 1'.l:-1 
D. JVeoLiberal J~lnancial Aid PolicieJ 
N eoliberalisn1 is prcn1iscd on encouraging productivity through the 
en1po\vern1cnt of individuals as economic actors_ 12-1- Salient characteristics 
of neoliberal policies arc "privatization, comn1ercialization, deregulation, 
and rcrcgulation." 12.'J 1'he 1972 An1endn1cnts to the Higher Education Act 
billion \1·orldwide). 
117. Ste \' . .\RGHESE, .wpm note 114·, at '.J (noling 1hat although econon1ic growth depends 
on nun1crous 18.ctors, "hu1nan capital" has becon1c an increasingly in1porlanl econmnic 
dri\Tr). 
1I8. Ser id. at 11 (explaining that cross-border education is n111tually beneficial for 
providers and beneficiaries or education). 
I 19. See, e.g., l~XESCO, GLOR.\Ll/.t·:n Soc1E·1 Y, rnpra note 111, at 8 (discussing the 
increased n1oven1cnt of' students and scholars between countries ''for con11nercial and /())·-
profit pu1voses"). 
120. See, r.g., OECD POLICY A . .\" . .\LYSIS, .~upm 110\c 98, al 24 ("A~ Lhc cost and 
1nultidisciplinary nalure of research at the scientific frontier increase, countries will also 
increasingly need to draw on ideas generated abroad.''). 
121. See VARGHESE, .rnj;m note I 14, at 11 ("The GA.TS [General Agrcc111cnt on Trade 
in Se1vices] ... represents a set of n1ultiiateral rules goyerning intc111ational trade in 
services."). 
122. Id. at 11-12. 
123. Ur.iESCO, GLOBAI.JZl·]) SOC!lTY, supra note 111, at 8 (listing new dcvclop1nents 
thal globalization has helped facilitate in higher education). 
124. See, e.g., SL\l'.GHJ'ER & RHOADES, suj1ra note 88, at 20 ("The ncoliberal state Cocuscs 
not on social wcH'are fOr the citizenry as a whole bul on enabling individuals as econon1ic 
actors. To that end, ncolibcral states 111ovc resources away from social welfare functions 
toward production (unctions."). 
125. Id. at 21. 
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arc considered landn1ark pieces of lcgislation. 12li /\n1ong other things, the 
An1cndn1cnts n1adc fCdcral student aid portable, 111caning students could 
use their aid at the schools of their choicc. 1'.l 7 1'hc 1\n1cnd1ncnts also 
"broadened the definition of \vhich institutions \Vere eligible to receive 
students \·Vith federal aid." 12B Specifically, proprietary and non-degree 
granting institutions could 110\V collect Title I\1 aid fi·on1 studcnts. 1'.l!l ~fhcsc 
shifts \Vere classic ncolibcral policies, in that they sought to encourage 
higher education efficiencies by cn1po,vcnng students and forcing 
institutions to engage in a "n1arkctlikc [_sic J con1pctition ... for federally 
subsidized student tuition dollars."UIJ The eITects of neoliberal policies arc 
apparent in other areas of higher education as \vell, including rescarch. 1:ii 
E. Changing Student }:Jopulations 
Broader access to higher education and the en1ergence of the knO\·vledgc-
bascd economy have fi_iclccl higher education cle1nand from ne\v student 
nlarkcts. Students of color and nontraditional adult learners arc seeking 
higher education in increasing nun1bers. I32 Affirn1ative Action progran1s 
and the expansion of nonselectivc colleges and universities have helped spur 
this increased level of participation. 133 The nun1ber of students of color 
undertaking higher education increased almost 49°/o bet\vccn 1994 and 
2004.13..J- Adult learners no\v con1prise niore than half of the college student 
126. See, e.g., Trow, .rnpm note B2, at 59 (as~erting that the 1972 education a1ncndn1cnts 
"established higher education as a national prio1ity in its own right"). 
127. See id. at 60 (explaining that student aid had previously been awarded directly to 
institutions in the fon11 of block gl·ants). 
128. Peterson & Dill, supra note I 08, al 5-6. 
129. Id. at 6. 
l 30. SL\l:G!-!TLR & RHOADES, supm note 88, at 35. 
131. ,)'ee id. at 21 (discussing the effects of the Bayh-Doyk ,c\ct, which allo\1·s institutions 
to dai1n O\\'ncrship of patents that arc based on research conducted with kdcral funds). 
132. See COUi'\C!L FOR ADL~1;r & EXPERIE:'\TJAL LEAR.'\J!'<G, SERVl.'\G ,c\DLJ.T LE:\R:\:ERS 
IN I-IJGHER EDUCATION: FI!\"Dli'K;s FROi\I CAEL's BE:\CH:'l!.--\RKr:-.:G STt.:oy I ( l 999), 
http://www.ca cl. org/ pd[/ p ublication_pdf I CAEL 0/o2 OB en ch1narki ng0/o20 Fin din gs0 io2 OExc 
cutivc0/o20Sun1n1ary.pdf (dcGning the adult learner as financially indcpcndcnt, with n1c~jor 
responsibilities outside or school, and "whose principal identities have evolved beyond the 
role ofCull-tiine student"). 
133. See 1viichacl I<..irst, Secondary and Po~lsecondal)' Linkages, in ECO:'\O.\llC l>:EQU.-\LJTY A:'\D 
HIGHER E1Jl;C.--\TJON: ACCESS, PERSISTENCE, . \..'\D SUCCESS 44-, 4-4---'l-6, 56 (Stacy Diclcrt-
Conlin & Ross Rubenstein eds., 2007) (noting the substantial rise in college enrolhncnt, 
especially in community colleges, and the fact that 80°/o o[ postsecondary students "attend 
posL~econdary institutions that either accept all qualified applicants or arc open 
enrollment"). 
]34-. BRYAN_J. COOK & DIA.:.'\/A I. CORDOVA, AM. COUNCIL O>: EDUC., l\1Jl\OR!TIES Ii\ 
HJGHER EDUC.--\TIO:'\: T\\1Ei\TY-SECO,\'J) Al\"NUAL STATUS REPORT 3 (Supp. 2007), 
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population. J'.-1.'i ..-fhcir prin1ary n1otivation for undertaking higher education 
is job skills training and profCssional dcvclop111cnt. 1'.'lti \ 1Vith these nc\v 
consumers have con1c llC\V needs and dcn1ands that vary fron1 those of the 
"typical college student" of the past. 1:-17 And institutions seeking to exploit 
these nc'v n1arkcts have been forced to acijust accordingly. i:rn Put sin1ply, 
the aca_dcn1ic capitalist systcn1 is pron1pting these institutions to respond to 
consu1ncr dcn1ands. 
F Rising Tuition 
State appropriations to higher education (as percentage of overall 
budgets) have declined steadily over the past three decades. u~i As a result, 
institutions have had to generate 111ore "n1arkct incon1c" 1-10 principally in 
the forn1 of tuition. HI Bcn.vccn 1976 and 2005, the average cost of a public 
four-year institution increased 270°/o. 1-l-2 Cornpounding the eifects of rising 
tuition has been a decline in federal funding of need-based student aid, 
particularly Pell Grants. 1-l-'.l T'vcnty years ago, the n1axin1un1 Pell Grant 
covered 60°111 of tuition at a typical public four-year institution; in 2006, 
that purchasing po\ver had declined to 33°/o. 1'1+ The discretionary nature of 
hup: I I\ 1'1\'\1·. accnc L. edu I Al\J IT e1np I a tc. cfin ?Seel ion ::::: CAREE& T cn1 plate:::: I CIVIi Content 
Display.cfn1&ContentID::::2'.17 I 6. 
135. 0FF!CE OF POLICY DEY. & H .. ESE.·\RCH, C.S. DEl'0 "1" OF LABOR, ADULT LEAR'.\'ERS !.'\ 
l-J1GHER EnL·c: . .\TJO:\: BAtUlll·:Rs TO St:cc:i-:ss A.\"D STR.-\TEGJES TO I:-.1rRovE Rt-:sL:1:1's 3 
(2007), http://1vclr.dokta.gov/rcscarch/FullTcxl_l)ocu1ncnts/Aclult0/o20LC'arners 0/n20 
in°/o20HighC'r0/o20Eclucation I .pelf. 
136 . . Yee id. (discussing ho11· cr01101nic \'olatility has fueled a "growing dc1nand frff 
continual learning and skill enhanccn1C'nt''). 
l'.17. Id. (idc1llifying the ''typical college stucknt" of the past as a "financially dependent, 
18-ycar-old high school gradua1e who enrolls full tiinc''). 
l'.18. Ser, e.g., Peterson & Dill, .lllpra not(' 108, at lfl-19 (discussing how the rising 
popularity of non-degree and continuing education progra1ns an1ong adult learners has 
/Orccd institutions to reassess their progra111n1atic oITe1ings). 
139. See, r.g., SL.\LGHTER & RHOADES, .wj1m note fl8, at 13 (noting thcll this trend 
occurred du1ing thC' 1970s, 80s, and 90s). 
140. ANCTIL, J11j1m note 10.'), al 4 (''[lvl]arket incon1c has increasingly substituted /Or 
public appropriations in higher education .... "). 
I'll. See, e.g., SL.-\L:cHTER & RHOADES, supra note 88, at 12 (explaining that increasing 
tuition has led in turn to higher expectations fron1 parents and students on the quality or 
education rccci1·cd). 
142. See, e./f,., Bridget Terry Long & Erin Riley, Financial Aid: 11 Broken Bridge to College 
.1lffe.u-?, 77 HARV. Enuc. REV. 39, 40 (2007) (noting that n1edian Ji:tn1ily inco1ne only 
increased by 23°/o during the sainc pc1iod). 
143. See, e.g., id. at 45 (noting that the n1axin1un1 Pell Grant has decreased by 20°/o fron1 
1975-1976 to 2005-2006 after accounting for inflation). 
i '}4-. COLLEGE BOARD.C:0:\1, TOTAL PELL GR.--\l\"T FU:\DING DECUXES FOR FIRST Tl.\JE 
J,\" Six YEARS (2006), http://ww\1'.collcgcboard.con1/prod_do1vnloads/prcss/cost06/ 
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higher cdtlcation funding has niade it an easy target for cuts, as entitled 
expenses such as health care increasingly strain state and federal btJdgcts. 1-l-5 
Students no\v finance a higher proportion of their tuition llSing loans. 
Bcnveen 1990 and 2004, the percentage of full-tin1e students \vith loans 
rose fron1 36°10 to 50°1o. 1·Hi Bet\vecn 1993 and 2004, cun1ulative debt levels 
for college students at public and private institutions rose 76°10 and 5 7°10 
respectively. 1-17 This shift has largely privatized the cost of higher 
education, thereby further entrenching the studcnt-as-consun1er n1indset 
that has con1e to characterize acadcn1ic capitalisn1. 1--l 8 
(;. Dnnands)Or JlccounLabiti{v 
Against the backdrop of declining funding cn1crged the den1and for 
educational accountability. Institutions arc no\v being called upon to 
clen1onstrate their "value for n1oncy"-an expression used to denote an 
organization's cconon1y, efficiency, and effectivcness. 1-l-9 In other \Vords, 
institutions have had to provide evidence of successful outcon1cs, 
particularly as they relate to student lcarning. 1::in Institutional assurances 
arc no longer sufficient, and assumptions arc no longer freely granted. 
_Fundan1cntally, policyn1akers \Vant colleges and universities to behave n1orc 
like private industry. In fact, the "resurgence of productivity and 
perforn1ance in An1erican business" has been cited as an in1petus behind 
the increased calls for educational accountability .15 1 Private sector 
\Vatch,vords like "perfonnance," "invcstn1cnt," and "efiiciency" have 
becon1c part of the higher education lexicon.1.12 Accountability models first 
pdl_grant.'\_06.pdf. 
145. S1'e, t.g., K.ASE. .flt/Hu note I 04, at 65-GG, 69-70 (illustrating an association bct\\'cen 
increases in state I\Jcclicarc spending and increases :in public four-year tuitions, and 
discussing the 1nannr:r in \1·hich entitlc1nent spending has a!ICcted federal spending on 
education, particulady gTanl progrmns such as Pell). 
1'}6. Long&Riley,.wpranotc 14'.2,at47. 
14-7. Id. at 47-4-8. 
l'l-8. See, e.g., SL-\L:GHTER & RHOADES, supra note 88, at 283 (noting that this trend has 
:ignored the beneficial externalities of higher education). 
149. Robert Ball & Jalil J-Ialwachi, Pe!finmanff Indicalon in f!igher Educalion, 16 HIGHER 
Ence. 393, :l93 (1987). 
150. I\.fa1i!yn C. K.aincen & Iv1anudj . .J ustiz, llsi11g Anessment in Ilig!u:r Education to lmproi'e 
Success/Or J1inorif:J St11de11l1, GG PE.-\BODY.J. EDUC. 46, 4-7 (1988) (asserting that state asscssn1cnt 
of student outcomes "en1ergcd as a rcn1arkable new feature in American higher education" 
as J'ar back as 1985). 
151. Alicia C. Dowd, From Accers to Outcome Equi!J: Revitalizing the DemOl:ratic Afission q/the 
Communi!J College, 586 A:\":\".--\1.S A\L ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 92, 93 (2003) (quotation 
on1iued). 
152. Seegeueralb']OSEPH D. CREl·T~H, S. Rt·:G'LEDcc. Bn., L!NKE\.G HIGHF.R EouCATIO\" 
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tested (and often discredited) in the privatc. sector have fOuncl hon1cs in 
higher education institutions. 153 
Dcn1ands for accountability have manifested in various \vays that reflect 
the capitalistic nature of education. J\.1Iost pron1incntly, states and 
accrediting agencies have required institutions to develop pcrforn1ancc 
indicators and n1cthods for assessing thcn1. l'vlany states have also tied 
institutional funding to pc1forn1ancc. 13-1 \Vhilc pcrforn1ancc indicators take 
n1any fonns, they arc most often expressed nun1crically, l .'JJ sin1ilar to private 
sector indicators. ~rhcy can be internal in nature (e.g., graduation rates, 
research funds obtained, and teaching quality), external (e.g., en1ployn1ent 
rates of graduates), and operational (e.g., unit costs, class sizes, and course 
options). L'Hi The accountability moven1ent has also contributed to a shift in 
hovv institutions present thcn1selves to potential consu111ers. It is no 
coincidence that schools no\v tout cn1ployn1ent rates and outcon1c-based 
indicators in advertisen1ents to prospective students. 'fhc accountability 
1novcment has played a considerable role in fostering the spread of 
acaden1ic capitalisn1 -..vithin higher education, particularly in tern1s of hovv 
institutional effectiveness is vievved internally and externally. 
fl. ]\reu_1 fligher Education I)roviders 
The advent of ne\·V providers cxen1plifies the interrelated nature of the 
trends contributing to the spread of acaclen1ic capitalisn1. The kno,vleclgc-
based econon1y has increased den1and for higher education, \vhich, along 
-..vith ncoliberal financial aid policies, has inccnti,,~zed entry of ncvv 
providers. Technological advancen1ents and globalization have cased these 
PERFOR,\l:\.:'\CEl~DICA'J'ORS 'lT1 GO.-\J,S (2000), hllp://c1ic.ed.go\'/PDFS/ED4-51781.pdC 
153. See Gary Rhoades & Barbara Sporn, QJuiliQ· A.1·J11rm1ce i11 Europe and the L'.S: 
Prqfi:.1:1·io11al and Political Ewnomic Framing ef lliglu:r Education Poliq, 43 Hil;HER EDCC. 355, 366 
(2002) (explaining ho\\' accountability 1nodcls "ani\-C at higher education's doorstep" aHcr 
initial lrials in business that lead to these n1odcls being "discarded") (quota1ion on1ittcd). 
I 54-. See Dowel, .rnj;ra note l 51, al ! 09-10 {noting that by 2000, aln1ost three-quarters of 
the states had performance funding syslen1s in place and tha1 the shill away fro1n input-
bascd funding to funding based on outco1ncs betokened a new en1phasis on accountability). 
155. Robert Ball & Rob \Vilkinson, The [i1·e and Abuse q/PedOnnance lndirnton in [,'KI ligher 
Education, 27 HIGHER EDUC. 417, 418 ( J 994-) (defining perfonnance indicators as 
"[n]u1ncrical values which provide a 1ncasurc1ncnt for assessing the quantitative 
perfrHn1ancc of a syste1n"). 
156. Ball & I-Ialwachi, supra note 14-9, at 401; see alro Bob Barnetson & l\larc Cut1;ght, 
Perfonnunce Indicators as Conceptual 1Cdmologies, 40 HIGHER Ence. 277, 278-79 (2000) 
(classifying indicators in terms of five organi;.:ational clc1nents to which per!On11ancc 
indicators are applied: (I) Inputs, e.g., faculty, facilities; (2) processes, e.g., teaching; (3) 
products, e.g., courses completed; (4-) outputs, e.g., degTecs awarded, grants secured; and (5) 
outcon1cs, e.g., e1nploy1ncnt rates). 
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pro\'idcrs' entry into the n1arkct. Changing student populations and rising 
tuition an1ong traditional institutlons have fostered ncvv markets and 
enhanced preexisting ones. Dcn1ands for accountability have introcluccd 
outcon1cs-bascd parlance and practices into the higher education 
industry-a shift upon \vhich nC\·\' providers have been able to capitalize. 
Proprietary schools arc the n1ost salient nc\V higher education providers. 
'fhcsc providers have entered the n1arkct and, in n1any \vays, adapted to 
nc"v realities n1orc cfICctivcly than their traditional peers. For starters, 
proprietary institutions have been successful at rcfran1ing thcn1sclvcs in 
response to the con1n1oditization of education. In fact, it could be argued 
that they never needed to rcfran1e in the first place. Their profit-generating 
n1otivcs already required thcn1 to respond to n1arket demands in \vays that 
nonprofit institutions did not. They have also adapted through an 
evolution of their ovvn. The conventional n101n-and-pop operations arc 
beeon1ing relics of the past as large, n1ulti-can1pus corporations no\v 
don1inatc the industry.1.17 In response to market dcn1ands, nlany of these 
institutions have also transcended their vocational n1oorings and 110\v 
a\varcl degrees up to the doctoral lcvcl. 158 Proprietary schools arc 110\v 
an1ong the largest and niost successful education providers in the 
country, L'i~l validating their market-driven approach and excn1plifying their 
superior adaptive ability. 
III. THE RISE OF PROPRIETARY COLLEGES 
JVluch has been \vrittcn about the recent "arrival" of proprietary schools 
into the higher education n1arkct; ho\vevcr, "reen1crgcnce" n1ight be a 
better descriptor. The history of proprietary schools in the United States is 
surprisingly long-pre-dating the s1gn1ng of the Declaration of 
Independence. They \Vere fixtures during Colonial tin1cs as alternatives to 
apprenticeships and the colleges of the day. 160 'l'hc purposes of these early 
institutions evolved fron1 teaching basic literacy to career training. u; 1 These 
l 5 7. Sre FOSTER, .rnj1ra note 23, at 8 (referring to these schools as ''super sys1e1ns''J. 
158. See, e.g., ANCTii., c,upra no\c 105, at 22. 
l.'"l9. The student cnrolhncnts of the five largest proprietary schools arc as follows: Apollo 
Group (Parcn\ Cornpany ofl;QP), +20,700; Education i\Janagcn1en1 Corporation, 112,700; 
I<aplan Higher Education, 103,300; Career Education Co1vorat.ion;, 93,100; and Dc\lry, 
90,365. Erica R. Hendry, For-Prefil College.> See 1~1Tge Increases in Enrollment and RrJenue, 
CHRO:\. HIGHER Enuc., .!\ug. 25, 2009, http://chronide.co1n/article/For-Profit-Colleges-
Scc-Lar/48173/. 
I 60. FOSTER, supra note 23, al 13. 
161. RlJCH, supra no\c 110, at 52 (chronicling how student inlercs\ prmnptcd early 
propric1a1y schools lo expand their CLln;cula lo include courses that taughl "skills that were 
in high dcn1and by c1nploycrs"). 
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institutions cn1bodicd the entrepreneurial spirit that \VOuld con1c to 
syn1bolizc the founding of the United States and the spread of higher 
cclucation. 11i:l These institutions also cn1braccd the ideal of educational 
access, 16 ~~ an ethos that \Vould hasten their rccn1crgcncc in the early 1970s. 
A. Title IV Erj1a11siu11 
The l970s brought vast expansion of the proprietary school 1narkct. 111·1 
The 1972 /\111cncln1cnts to the Higher Education Act sought to broaden 
higher-education access by n1aking proprietary institutions eligible to collect 
Title IV aic\. 1(;.'i i\nxious to tap into Title I\1, propricta1y schools 
aggressively recruited students by touting progran1s that purported to 
provide job training; ho\vevcr, n1uch of the pron1ised training never 
materializcd. 11i6 1'he lack of effective oversight provided an cnvironn1cnt in 
vvhich shan1 schools and diplon1a n1ills operated vvith virtual in1punity. Hi 7 
As a result, student defaults on Title IV loans increased sharply.168 The 
l 990s brought closer scrutiny on the proprietary school sector, and bctvveen 
1992 and 1997, aln1ost 800 schools \Vere shut dovvn or stripped of their 
Title IV eligibility-\vhich effectively shut clo\vn schools not closed 
outright. lli'1 But \vhilc the an1ount of docun1cnted in1proprieties an1ong 
proprietary schools has fallen, the sector's disproportionate share of federal 
investigations shovvs that in1proprieties rcn1ain a problen1. 
B. Students 
Proprietary schools serve students currently undcrscrvccl by traditional 
institutions. 170 They tend to enroll the "other 75 percent"-studcnts '\vho 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 57 (discussing how propriclary schools were mnong the lirst institutions to 
educate fon11cr slaves and l\ativc An1ericans). 
16'1·. C.S. GE:\. Accot;.\"!'JNG OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-103, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: 
POORER STt.:DE:\"j" OL:TCO,\IES AT SCHOOLS THAT RELY .tv101u: o,-.; FEDERAL STU])E,,T AID 
3 ( 1997), avaiU1ble al http:/ /w\\'w.gao.gov/archivc/ 1997 /he97 l 03.pdf [hereinafter GA.O, 
POORER OL:'J'CO:\JES]. 
J 6_"). See e.g., GAO, OVERSUPPLIED 0CCUPXr!ONS, supra note 22, at 7. 
166. See, r.g., FOSTER, Jupra note 23, at 14. 
167. id. ("During the 1970s and 80s, institutions operated with little or no oversight and 
few co11straints in recruiting and training students. A !argc ntunbcr of institutions did not 
provide the training advertised, did not comply with fair consumer practices, and 
1nisn1anagcd finances."). 
168. See, e.g., id. 
169. Linehan, supra note 7, at 760. 
170. See, e.g., Anli-Fraud llemings, supra note I 0, at 2 (stalcment or Rep. John Bochner, 
Chain11an, H. Comm. on Educ. and the \'Vorkforcc) ("ProprictaI)' schools ... arc playing a 
critical role in providing college access for son1c of our Nalion's n1ost vulnerable students. 
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\Vere not in the top 25 percent of their high school classes and 'vho \-vould 
be unlikely to enroll or be successful at other types of institutions." 171 
Proprietary school students tend to be poorer 11'.! and older than students at 
traditional schools. 17:l They arc also nlore likely to be first in their fan1ilics 
to go to collcgc1 17·1 be fen1ale, 11·1 and to belong to a racial or ethnic minority 
group. 17 f1 1vfany proprietary schools a\varcl a disproportionately high 
percentage of degrees through the doctoral level to black and llispanic 
stuclents, 177 and their graduates typically con1plete dcgTcc requircn1ents 
faster than graduates of traditional schools. 17H 'J'hese statistics arc laudable, 
and they confinn that proprietary schools help broaden access to higher 
education. Ho\vever, this access is niotivated n1orc by profit than 
altruisn1. 17 ~1 1vforeover, this access con1es at a high cost, due to high rates of 
attrition at these institutions and concornitant high rates of loan defaults 
an1ong fOrmer students. 
C. Outc01nes 
Proprietary schools suffer fron1 poor student outcon1cs. Lo,ver 
completion rates tend to create negative cascades that depress placen1ent 
And thus, they arc playing a nitical rok in carrying oul the 1nission of the I-Iigher Education 
Act."). 
17 J. FOSTER, sujJra note 23, at 10 (quotation mnitted). 
172. See G/'1.0, STRO:\GER OVERSIGHT, .l'lljJHJ note 13, at 20 (listing the 2004 annual 
111cdian fan1ily incon1c for proprietary school stuclcnt.'i as $2-'J.,300, cmnparcd to $40,400 and 
$49,200 !Or students at public and p1i\'alc nonprofit schools, respectively). 
17'.~. Ste id. at 7 (finding that 56°/u or students at prop1ielary schools arc age iwcnly-li\T 
and older, con1parcd to 35"/o and 38°/o at public and pri\·atc nonpro(il schools respectively}. 
174. Sn id. at 20 (finding that 63°/n of prop1ictary school students' parents Jack a colkge 
degree, con1pared lo 48°/o and 39°/o al public and private nonprofit schools, respectively). 
17 5. See id. al 7 (finding that 63°/n of students at proprietary schools arc kn1alcs, 
con1pared lo 54''./n and 56°/o al public and pri\·atc nonprofit schools rcspccti\Tly); see ulrn .-lnti-
Fmud llearings, supra note 10, al 46 (statcn1enl of :."lick Glakas, President, Career College 
1\ssociation) (stating that prop1iclary schools enroll a large percentage of single parents). 
176. See GA.0, STRO.'\GER OVERSIGHT, .111pra note 13, al 8 (finding that 50':;o orstudenls 
al prop1ietary schools arc non-white, coinparcd to 34°/o and 30°/o for studcnls at public and 
p1i\'alc nonprofit schools, rcspcctivrly). 
177. Prop1iclary schools award 25°/o of the associate's dcg1-ccs, 7°/o of the bachelor's 
degrees, and 6°/o of the 1nastcr's degree earned by Hispanic ~tudents. 'Vaiden Cnivcrsity, an 
online proprietary school, ranks ainong the top ten of doctoral degree-granters to black 
students. Anti-Fraud 1 fearings, .wpm note I 0, al '1-7. 
178. Id. al 46 ("On average, students attending career colleges earn their associates 
dcgree[s] clc\'cn n1onths sooner than students at con1nn1nity colleges."). 
179. See K.IRP, supra note 87, al 253 (stating that proprietary schools "ha\'C no 
con1mitment to the idea or public service, no sense of their n1ission as lied to the good or the 
co1nn1onwcallh"). 
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rates and increase loan default rates. !Bo l,css than 25°/o of propricta1y 
school students graduate \vithin six years of beginning their studies, 
con1parcd to 55°/o and 64°/o at public and private nonprofit institutions 
rcspcctivcly. 181 Regrettably, this statistic is probably inflated, given that it is 
based on self-reported data, and proprietary schools have 111any incentives 
to overstate graduation rates. I!!'.! Placement rates also dcn1onstratc 
inadequacies \vithin the sector. Schools \Vith the lo\vcst con1plction rates 
tend to have the lo-\vcst placcn1cnt ratcs. 11n This observation is particularly 
cla111ning because placcn1cnt rates do not account for attrition; only 
students \vho con1plctc the progran1 arc included in the calculations. The 
final links in the chain arc student loan default rates. Proprietary school 
default rates exceed nonprofit schools at the nvo-, three-, and four-year 
intervals. 1*H And once again, the validity of these nun1bers is questionable, 
as the n1ethocl of calculation allO\VS schools to understate their actual 
nun1ber of defaults. 18.'i 
There arc n1any reasons for the lo\vcr con1plction rates at proprietary 
schools-and not all of then1 arc nefarious. The prin1ary reason concerns 
the negative association bet\veen reliance on Title IV aid and completion 
ratcs.18ti This association arises because poorer students persist tovvards 
college degrees at lo\vcr rates than vvcalthicr students.187 This phenomenon 
holds true across higher education, irrespective of sector, and is often used 
as a po\verful justification for those seeking increased or better-targeted 
student aid. IBB And because proprietary schools enroll higher percentages 
of poor students, it n1akcs sense that their completion and placcn1ent rates 
180. GAO, POORER ()L:TcO.\JES, .wpm note 1611·, at 5. 
J 8 I. K .. \"APP ET ,\L., Jupra note 6, at 12. 
182. LOO.\"I.\" & DE\".-\.'\'!HJ::RY, .\'lljira note 29, at '.18 {"The reliability of the nu1nbers in 
IPEDS is based solely on the reporting done by lhe institutions thcn1sch·cs. This is 
extrcn1cly probkn1atic as il ka\"es nearly absolute discretion in the hands of schools that 
ha\·e e\·c1y inccnti\T Lo inflate the nun1bcrs."). 
183. 5're GAO, POORER 0LTC0.'dES, supra note 161}, at 9. 
184. Sre GA.0, STRO:\"GER OVERSIGHT, .rn/Jm note 13, at 14~]5 (listing proprietary 
school default rates that arc as nn1ch as 250°/o higher than the next highest rate-that of 
public schools). 
185. See id. at 13···14 ("l"J'Jhe rate captures only a s1nall portion of all student loan 
dd~1uhs al schools."). 
186. See GA.O, POORER OL:TCO;\JES, sujirn note 164. at 24-25 (de1nonstrating that 
increased reliance by schools on Title I\7 revenue leads to lower con1plction and g1·aduation 
rates, and higher default rates). 
187. See Long & Riley, supra note 142, at 4-0 (explaining that only +'.YVo of students Croin 
fan1ilics 1naking less than $30,000 per year ''inu11ediatcly entered a post-secondary 
institution" co1nparcd to 75°/o ofstudenl.5 whose fa111ilics 1nakc 1norc than $50,000). 
188. See, e.g., id. at 58 (concluding that the Pell Grant will provide 1nore access lo higher 
education ror low-inco111e students). 
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arc lo,vcr and their dc£'lult rates highcr. IB!l 
Hovvevcr, not all factors contributing to these lo\-ver rates arc benig11. 
ProprietaIJ' schools enroll n1any students \vho clearly lack the ability to 
con1plctc a postsecondary progran1 of study. 1 ~lo In other \VOrds, they exploit 
their role as access providers-for profit. As discussed earlier, forn1er 
adn1issions representatives allege that they \Vere pressured to induce 
cnrolhncnt an1ong unqualified students. i\nd as 60 1\1inuLes docun1cntcd, 
proprietary schools engage in entrance exa111 in1proprictics in order to 
ensure that all prospective students attain satisf3-cto1)· scores. i\ctions like 
these ha\'C created a perception that proprietary schools care less about 
their students and n1orc about their students' Title I\1 cligibility. 1'.ll 
D. lndust~T 
l"'oclay, the proprietary sector is don1inatcd by five publicly-traded 
entities: Apollo Group (parent company of UOP), Education i\1fanagen1ent 
Corporation, Kaplan Higher Education, Career Education Corporation, 
and DcVry. Combined, these institutions enrolled n1orc than 820,000 
students in 2009. 192 All told, there arc 2,900 Title IV-eligible proprietary 
schoolsJ 93 providing both degree progran1s and vocational training. UH The 
predominant niche of proprietary education rcn1ains career-focused 
cducation.1!15 They have harnessed nc\v technologies in delivering 
189 . .)'er GAO, POORER 0UTCO:\!ES, supra note 164-, at 20 ("\Ve- believe knowing a 
school's c01npletion rate helps predirl its place1nent rate and knowing both co1nplction and 
placc1ncnt rates helps predict its default rate."). 
190. See K.JRP, .wpm note 87, al 250 ("\Ve accept students who, on paper, arcn'l likely to 
n1akc it. . .")(quotations on1itted). 
191. Sl'l' .'Jnti-Fraad llearings, .\llpm note- 10, at 22 (statcn1cnt of Rep. 1\Jc1xinc \Vatcrs) 
C'r1Jhe real n1oti\'C behind wanting to enroll more 1nino1ity and low incon1c students is that 
they arc the 1110s! profitable students since they qualify for the- highcst ainounts of federal 
financial aid and the s1nallest expected fa111ily contribution, or none at all."). 
192. See Hcnchy, supra note 159. 
193. L.\l.:RA G. KNAPP ET Al.., ..\-xl"L CTR. !-"OR EDUC. STATISTJC:S, t_:.s. DEP'T OF 
EnL:c., XCES 2009-165, POSTSECO\'D.-\R\" l:\'STITUTJONS AND PRICE OF ATl"E.\"D.·\.'\'CJ·: !'\ 
THE UNITED STATES: FALL 2008, DEGREES AND OTHER A\VARDS CONFERRED 2007-08, 
A'\D !2-i\JO:\"TH E'\ROLLi\·lEi\-r: 2007-08 7 (2009), http://c1ic.cd.go\·/PDFS/ 
ED5067H.pd[ 
194. See FOSTER, supra note 23, at 8 ("The p1in1ary purpose o[ for-profit postsecondary 
institutions is preparing graduates for jobs or career advanccn1cnt. As a result, these 
institutions generally oITer a sn1all, focused range of progrmns limitcd to high-dcn1and 
occupational or professional fields."). But see gcnera![y GAO, OVERSUPPLIED QccL:P . .\T!O.'\S, 
supra note 22, at 4-5 (discussing the amount of federal financial aid used by studenL5 training 
for low-demand fields). 
195. See KJRP, .wpm note 87, at 242 (listing the lVfHA program as an cxan1pic o[ a 
predon1inant niche of prop1ictary education). 
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ccluc<ition progr3.n1n1ing, both onlinc and in the classroon1.1~it1 Their 
progran1s arc flexible and accelerated, thus appealing to older students \vho 
tend to be place-bound and lin1itcd in ho\v n1uch tin1c they can spend 
attending classes. 1 ~ 1 i Given their adaptive skills, it should be no surprise that 
\Vhilc traditional schools arc dealing \\'ith cnrolln1cnt and budgetary 
shortfalls, proprietary schools arc experiencing vastly increased cnrolln1cnt 
and rcvcnuc. 1(jfl 
E. Prqjitahilifv 
?\Jany proprietary schools arc highly profitable. In 2006, .Apollo Group 
and ITT boasted rctnrns on invcstn1cnt capital of 69°/o and 40°1() 
respectively, beating out con1panics such as Exxon l'vlobil and r.._.Jicrosoft. 1 '.l~J 
Since 1995, Apollo's stock price has risen an unfathon1able 7 ,000°/o, and 
rr'r's Stock price has risen 1110re than 3,500°/o.200 1'he Stock prices for 
other publicly traded education providers have experienced precipitous 
196. See An1i-Fm11d Ilearings, supra nole IO, al 46 (stale1nent oC Kick Giakas, President, 
Career College A.ssociation) ("For-profit instjlutions arc pionee1ing a wide array of 
innovative progra1n ddi\TI)' n1cthodologics such as on-line, 1nodular, and \\'eekend 
progTa1ns to con1plcn1cnl their traditional dassromn offerings."). 
I 97. Ser id. ("Students choose to attend ror-prolit colleges because these ddiYcry 1nethods 
1nec1 their tin1c and geographical needs, allowing thc1n to achic"e 1hcir postsecondary 
education goals while continuing· to 1neet the den1ands of their C\'Cry day lives. On average, 
students attending career colleges earn their associates degree eleven 111onths sooner than 
students at con1n1unity colleges.''). 
198. See Hendry, supr(/ note 159 ("'1'hc recession has kll nonprofit colleges and 
universities across the country struggling \l~lh budget cuts and uncertainlies over cnrolhncnt, 
but rnany for-profit institutions arc reporting record increases in student nun1bcrs and 
H:\'Cnuc-a sign that the recession is pro1npling 111mT adults and nontradi1ional students 10 
seek career training."). 
199. HO\YARD 11. BLOCK, B.-\:'\K OF A:\L SEC. LLC, STATE:\lE.\T BEFORE THE 
SECRETARY OF EDL.'.C.-\TIO:'\'S CO.\l:\llSSIO'\ O'\ THE FVl'LlRE OF HIGHER EDt..:CATJO:\ 10 
(2006), ht t p: I I' vw\ v. cd .gov I a bo u 1 /bd scon11n /list I hi cdf u tu re/ 3 rd-111 ccting /block2. pelf. 
200. On January 3, !995, Apollo and ITT slack were priced at $0.79 and $2.22, 
respectively . . NCu.1 lUrk Slack Exchange Composite Tra11s11cti01H, 'VALL ST.j.,Jan. 3, !995, al 23, 
auailable al http:/ /ww\v ,bigcharts.cmn/ custon1/w~jie/ wsjbb-histo1ical.asp?syn1b::::APOL 
&dose_datc:::: l 0/o2F3°/o2Fl 995&x:::O&y:::O; .N:·'lSDAQ.i'{alionaL J1arket hsue.1~ \VALL s·i·.J., Jan. 
3, 1995, at 25, http://www.bigcharts.co111/cuslon1/wsjic/wsjbb-
historical.asp?sy1nb:::csi&closc_dale::: I 0/o2F3°/o2F1995&x:::O&y:::O. By late 2009, 1hey were 
trading at around $60 and $90 respectively. Biggest 1,000 Stocks, \VAL!. ST.j., N"ov. I 3, 2009, 
at C8, available al http:/ /www.bigcharts.con1/custom/w~jic/w~jbb­
hislorical.asp?syn1b:::apol&dosc_datc::: 11 °/o2F l 3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O; \V~J .com, Historical 
Quotes, ITT Educational Services, Inc, http:/ /www.bigcharls.com/custon1/w~jic/w~jbb­
historical.asp?syn1b:::csi&close_datc::: 11°/o2FI3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O (last visited Aug. 4, 
2010) 
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increases as \vcll. 201 A n1aJor con1poncnt of proprietary schools' 
profitability is operational efficiency. 202 
]-<~ Operational Ejjiciencies 
Like any profit-seeking entity, proprietary schools "place a high value on 
running their operations efficiently and taking advantage of cconon1ics of 
scale. "'lo:i '1'hcy n1inin1izc inefficiencies in acadcn1ic planning and teaching 
by designing curricula ccntrally20+ and relying principally on untcnurcd 
faculty to render instruction. 2115 Son1c proprietary schools even base 
instructor pay on the nun1bcr of students in the instructor's class.20G They 
use technology to n1inin1izc incfiicicncics in adn1inistrativc operations, such 
as in ac\n1issions. '2° 7 Sonic proprietary schools pron1ote efficiency by 
calculating optin1al £3.cilitics usage ratios. 20B These calculations help 
institutions clctcrn1ine the size of their facilities and the types of leasing 
20 I. De \11)' stock p1ice has r:iscn 11101-c than '.1,200'Yo since J 991. Compare Biggest 1, 000 
Stock.r, \V . .\1.L ST. J., ~o\'. 13, 2009, at C 7, availabk al 
http:// ww\V. b:igcharls.co1n/ custo1n/ \v~jic/ \v~jbb-
histo1ical.asp ?syn1b:::apol&dose_datc::: I I 0/o2Fl 3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O, with \VSJ.crnn, 
Historical Quotes, Dc\!ry Inc, http://11'\V\1·.bigcharts.con1/custo1n/1vsjic/wsjbb-
historical.asp?syn1b:::l)\I &close_datc::: I 2°/o2Fl 011/o2FI 991&x:::I9&y::: I 0 (last \'isited J-\t1g. 4, 
2010). Career Educa1ion Co1vorat:ion stock price has iisen 1norc than 750°/o since 1998. 
Compare .,\';JSJJAQ. ... \'(i/ional .lfmkel h.wes, \VALL ST. J., ])cc. 10, 1998, at C9, rwailabl.e al 
http: I I ww1 v. bi gc h arts.cmn I cus lo 1n/ w~jie I 11·.~jbb-h i slori cal .asp ?syn1b::: CEC O&dosc 
_date::: I 2°/u2Fl 0°/o2Fl 998&x:::O&y:::O, with \'\'SJ.cmn, Historical Quotes, Career Education 
Co1v, http://\v11'\1·.b:igcharts.co1n/ct1ston1/1v~jic/1v~jbb­
hisl01ical.asp?syn1b:::ccco&closc_da1e::: l I 0;iJ2Fl 3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O (last visited .!-\ug. +, 
2010). 
202. R_L:ctt, .rnjJm note 110, at 76 (citing· "Scale Econoinies and Operating Efficiencies'' 
as onr of seven ''lngrcdicnls for Profitability" for proprietary schools). 
20'.~. Id. at 88. 
204. See id. at 118-19 (stating that although the faculty ·'arc the center of acade1n:ic life," 
the president is expected to 1naintain 111anagcrial control 01·cr decision nutking). 
205. See id. at 119 (noting the apparent ''lack of a tenure systcn1 al ·for-profit 
universities"). 
206. Goldie Bltuncnstyk, Ussons fiwn For-Prqfit l11stit11tions About Culling College Co.>ls, 
CHRON. I-IJGHER EDUC., .June 5, 2008, hup://chron:icle.con1/articlc/For-Profit-Colleges-
Sharc-L/867 /. 
207. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sdingo, Li. q/ Plweni:r. Owe.> ·Raj;id Growth lo [i'.\e ef Tedmology, ]ls 
President Stgis, CHROl\". HIGHER Eouc., June 17, 2005, at J-\23, available at 
http:/ /chron:iclc.con1/arlicle/C-of-Phoenix-Owcs-Rapid-Gr/3394/ (reporting that 4·0°/o of 
all adn1issions decisions by the Cnivcrsity of Phoenix arc "made without hu1nan 
:intervention"). 
208. Facility costs arc the second largest expense incmTcd by prop1ietary schools, behind 
sala1ics. Blumcnstyk, .>upra note 206. 
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agreements they enter. 2o~J 
Enrolln1cnt n1anagcn1cnt, ho\vcvcr, is the prin1ary n1cthod that 
proprietary schools use to pron1otc cfficicncics.210 Like all institutions, 
proprietary schools need stuclcntsi but their need is 1norc intense than that 
of n1ost nonprofit schools. 211 ~1Iost nonprofits arc able to subsidize their 
expenses \vith non-tuition revenue, such as cndovvn1cnt incon1c or public 
appropriations. Proprietary schools, ho\vcvcr, do not benefit fro111 such 
subsidies. ;\s a result, each student represents a revenue strcan1 that 
directly affects the con1pany's botton1 linc. 21 2 As such, these institutions arc 
under intense and constant pressure to increase enrolln1ents. 1\nd given 
this pressure, it should be no su11Jrisc that in1proprietics in the sector aln1ost 
ahvays bear sonic relation to institutions' cnrolln1ent n1anagen1ent 
functions. 
G. EmjJhasis on Recruitment 
Adn1issions representatives at proprietary schools arc essentially 
salcspeople.2I'.{ At many proprietary schools, the nun1ber of adn1issions 
representatives is greater than full-tin1e faculty. 21 -l- Proprietary schools also 
invest heavily in advertising;2 15 anyone \·vho has ever vvatched daytin1c or 
late-night TV can attest to this. In fact, rccn1itment and marketing 
expenses typically chvarf the total salaries paid to faculty.21ti Proprietary 
school advcrtisen1ents often portray education as the path to a career and 
to financial security-and the advertising institution as the ideal provider of 
that education. Unfortunately, 111any of the electronic and h11n1an 
representatives of proprict<'try schools proffer n1isrepresentations as a 111eans 
209. This approach to n1anaging space diOCrs son1cwhat Cron1 that oC 111ost nonprofit 
schools, as these schools arc oficn inccntidzcd to own their facilities and expand such 
holdings. id. 
'210. See RUCH, s11j1ra note l 10, at 88 (discussing how proprietary schools track class 
enrolhncnts closely and rnake ac\jusl111cnts accordingly}. 
211. See, e.g., l(JRP, supra note 87, at 242 ("Increasing cnrolhncnt has !O be the 
para111ount concern for any for-profit universily, especially one whose stock is publicly 
traded."). 
212. See id. at 242, 247 (claiming that for-profit universities, such as Dc\lry, have higher 
tuition and n1ust use aggressive markeling and recruiting to bring in prospective students). 
213. See id. at 247 (explaining that fOr schools with 111ultiple campuses, these individuals 
arc often responsible for recniiling on behalf of c1ll schools within a particular region). 
214. Anti-Fraud liemings, supra note 10, at 8 (statc111ent of Rep. J\tlaxine 'Vatcrs). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. ("The amount spent on advertising, lead creation, recruiting, and admissions 
representativc5 far exceeds the salaries paid to faculty."). 
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of inducing cnrolln1cnt. 217 The primary targets of these n1isrcprcscntations 
arc people \vho arc n1ost susceptible to being fooled by thc111 and n1ost 
likely to reap the negative effects of an unsuccessful educational experience. 
Therefore, a clear in1pcrativc to prevent schools from inducing cnrolln1cnt 
using n1isrcprcscntations exists. 
IV. THE NEED FOR TIGHTER REGGLATIO:'\ Of HIGHER Em;C-\TIO:'\ 
RECRUTJllE:'\T A:'\D MARKETL\G 
'fhc typical proprietary school student is undertaking education for very 
pragn1atic rcasons-n1ost often, earning a degree that \vill soon result in a 
\vcll-payingjoh.2 18 Cognizant of their niche, proprictaI)-' schools have clone 
a convincing job of characterizing thcn1selves as effective, if not obligatory, 
intcrn1ccliaries bct\vccn job seekers and the job n1arket.2 1 ~ 1 i\nd both 
through their advertiscn1cnts and their rccruitn1cnt practices, proprietary 
schools use the singlc-n1incled dctern1ination con1n1on an1ong their students 
to their advantage. Take for exan1ple the follo,ving jingle, \.vhich is sung in 
very catchy fashion on a television con1111ercial for a co111pany that n1arkets 
onlinc progra111s for proprietary schools. 220 The lyrics arc \.Vritten fron1 the 
perspective of a prospective student: 
1'111 \vorking for an hourly \vage 
I \Vent to high school didn't do great 
Still I gotta n1ake n1orc cash 1nore education is \vhat 1'111 looking at 
\Vhcn I get a clcgTcc, l \vill 1nakc a bigger salary 
So nu\\' I've got to sec \·vhich college is right for n1c 
I \vent on the in1ernct and found Education Connection 
l took son1e free tests to find out n1y direction 
1'111 taking n1y classes onlinc getting 111y degree on 1ny O\\'n ti1nc 
Education Connection 1natchcd n1e \Vith the rig·ht college for free!~~r 
The lyrics touch on all the con1n1on thcn1es utilized by proprieta1y 
schools 111 pursuing their n1arket, including n1onctary benefit and 
convcn1cncc. fv1orcovcr, the con1n1ercial is replete \vith graphical 
statcn1cnts, such as "Niakc $25,000 Niorc Each Ycar."222 
217. See K..JRI', s11jira noLe 87, at 2'1·2 (admiuing that because recruiters arc expected to 
n1eet enrolbncnt quotas, that they son1eti1nes oversell the school ;.uid "skirtO the border of 
tnisrcprcsentation "). 
218. See, e.g., id. at 245. 
219. See Linehan, .rnj1ra note 7, at 757-58 ("Students generally view prop1ictary schools 
as the gatekeepers to their trade ofehoiee .... "). 
220. YouTube.co111, Education Conncctio11 "Get Connected" TV ConunereiaJ, 
hllp:/ /www.youtube.corn/watch?v:::::7aOwatOC2clfd (last visited Aug. 4, 20 I 0). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
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~4. 77ie Susceptibilities oj"Lfze 1'1arket 
Given the educational niche proprietary' schools have carved out, the 
111ost con1n1on targets of propricta1y school advcrtiscn1cnts arc poor, 
undereducated, and oldcr.'.!23 Individuals \vho fit this profile arc highly 
susceptible to being persuaded by n1isrcprcscntations due to their lack of 
insight about higher cducation.'.!:!4 Unlike t)1)ical students at traditional 
colleges and universities, n1ost proprietary school students arc first-
gcncration college students. '.!'lj This lack of educational experience li111its 
their ability to discern honest clai111s fro1n clcccptivc ones. They arc 111orc 
likely to finance their education 'vith student loans and eventually default 
on those loans. 22 r; 1"'hcy arc least likely to con1plain about unfair conduct to 
,vhich they have been subjectcd,227 and even for those vvho do con1plain, 
current safeguards arc inadequate in pro,.~ding effective ren1edies.2211 
Assurances that an educational progran1 'vould quickly lead to a 'vell-
paying job arc very con1pelling. Add a lack of higher education exposure 
and a burning desire to escape poverty to the equation, and it becon1cs 
clear \Vhy n1isrcpresentations concerning graduation and placen1cnt rates 
arc so dangerous. 
B. The Costs of Failure 
Proprietary schools arc relatively expensive to attend. ' 1Vhen compared 
to public and private institutions, proprietary schools charge by far the 
highest average tuition for non-degree and t'vo-year degree progran1s.22~i 
Additionally, the average tuition for bachelor's degree progran1s at 
proprietary schools is higher than the average public school tuition, though 
slightly Io,ver than private school tuition.2::10 'T'hese high tuition rates have 
encouraged high levels of borro,ving an1ong proprietary school students. 
Sevcnty-t"vo percent of proprietary school students finance their education 
(at least in part) 'vith Stafford loans; this is the highest percentage in higher 
education.:ni The average an1ount of these loans is S5,800 for proprietary 
223. Sec, r.g., Linehan, supra nole 7, at 757 {explaining the t}1Jes of advertising that 
proprietary schools use when focusing on certain demographics). 
22'k See. e.g., id. at 757-58. 
225. A111i-.F'raud I lcmings, ;,upm note 10, at 46 (slalcn1cnl of l'\ick Glakas, "Presidcnl, Career 
College Association). 
226. See, e.g., GAO, S"J'RO.'\GER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, at 28. 
227. See, e.g., FOSTER, .wjJra note 23, at 24·. 
228. See Linehan, supra note 7, at 754 (alleging that the current legal doctrine fails to 
protect students fron1 the schools' predatory practices). 
229. K . .'\APP E·1· AL, supra note l 93, at 6. 
230. Id. 
231. See CHR!STL\'A CH . .\,.'\G ''VE! ET AL., l\~AT'I. CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT!STJCS, U.S. DJ·:P'T 
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school students; once again, the highest in higher cc\ucation.'.l:tz It is no 
vvondcr that \vhilc proprietary school undergraduates only account for 8°/o 
of students in higher education, they account for 18°/o of the loan 
volun1c. 2 '.1 3 
The da\-vnsidc of these high borro-\ving rates is n1anifcstcd n1ainly in the 
high default rates an1ong iOnncr proprietary school students. Proprietary 
schools account for a disproportionate share of student loan clcfaults.2'.H In 
2006, the sector's t\vo-ycar cohort default rate \Vas 8.6°/o, the highest in 
higher cclucation.2:i:i Default rates an1ong all borro\vcrs increase over tin1c, 
but the increase is n1uch higher an1ong proprietary school borro,-vcrs. 
1\hnost a quarter of proprietary school borro,vers default on student loans 
,.vithin four years of entering rcpayn1cnt, greatly exceeding the public and 
private school sectors. '.2:lG '"fhc effects of student loan defaults arc in1n1cnsc. 
Individuals 'vho default acquire negative credit history that li111its their 
ability to secure housing or other loans.2::17 They could also face incon1e 
garnishn1ents and restricted cn1ployn1cnt options. 2:lB And to the 
disappointment of n1any, it is very difficult to discharge federal student 
loans in bankruptcy.23!l For taxpayers, the costs of covering defaults arc 
immense as \vcll. Taxpayers cover virtually all the expenses associated \Vith 
defaulted loans, including interest, and the price tag is in the billions of 
dollars. 2-rn 
OF EDLC., :\CES 2008-179rcT, TRl~~DS J.'\ l~SDERGR.--\DL".--\Tl·: BORRO\\'L'\G II: FEDERAL 
STCDE'.\'T LO.-\:'\S J.'\ I 995-96, 1999-2000, A\"D 2003-04 19 (2008), 
hllp:/ /nces.cd.go\·/pubs2008/2008 l 791-c\·.pc!f (!isLi11g borro\ving· percentages for public 
two-year, public four-year, and pti\'a!c institutions in 200'.3-04- as l l'Y'n, 42°/o, and 53°/o 
respectively). 
232. Id. at 20 (listing average loan an1ounts fOr public two-year, public four-year, and 
private not-lOr-profit institutions in 2003-2001J. as $3,400. $4,900, a11cl $5, J 00 rcspccti\·cly). 
233. Id. at 21. 
23+. GA.0, POORER OLTCU.\IES, .rn/H11 note !64, al 5. 
235. GAO, STRO.'\GER O\'ERSIGHT, s11jJl't1 nole !3, al 13 (sl<lting that the public and 
pri\·ate nonprofit sectors had rates of 4. 7'~'n and 3°/n respectively). 
236. See id. at 15 (pro\'iding a four-year default rate of ~tL'.1'Y\, Cur prop1ietary school 
borrowers and 9.5°/o and 6.5'Vo for public and private school borrowers, respeeLi\'cly). 
237. E.g., id. at 12. 
238. Id. 
239. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Educ., Federal Student A.id, Con11non Disputes JnyoJ\'ing 
Defaulted Student Loans, hup:/ /w\vw.ed.go\'/ offiecs/OSFAP/J)CS/disputes.hl1nl# 
Bankruptcy (last visited Aug. 4-, 20 I 0) ("\Vhcther a bankruptcy di5chargc relieves an 
individual or his or her obligation to repay a student loan or grant overpay1nent is now 
deLennined by whether a court has ruled that repay1nent would i1nposc an undue hardship 
on the bor:rO\ver and his or her dependents.''). 
240. See 011enighi !Jeming 011 the Department ef Education: f Iemings Before the Subcomm. on Iluman 
Resources and lntergo11emme11tal Rel.a lions ef the II Comm. on Gouemment Refonn and Ovenight, 1 O+th 
Cong. 15 ( J 995) (state1nent of Richan] \V. Riley, Secretary of Education). 
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Given the disadvantaged backgrounds fron1 \vhich proprietary school 
students often con1c, these students lack the social clout and political 
sophistication necessary to foster \vidcsprcacl disn1ay regarding their 
victin1ization. They arc less likely to even con1plain about fraud 
perpetrated against thcn1 by proprietary schools.'.!-l-I Even for those \Vho 
con1plain, current legal and regulatory processes provide fc,v options for 
redress. '.!-t'.! 
V. ].'\.illEQl:.\TE SAFEGL\.IWS 
The prominence of higher education institutions makes them frequent 
targets of la\vsuits. The diverse nature of this litigation represents a virtual 
111icrocosn1 of An1crican jurisprudence. But in adjudicating disputes 
involving higher education institutions, courts have been rather consistent 
about their reluctance to intrude upon the inner \Vorkings of these 
institutions. This reluctance has been termed acaden1ic abstention.2+::1 The 
concept has been applied in cases involving all types of educational 
institutions, and its fundamental pren1ise is the judiciary's belief that the 
professional judgment of educators should be protected fron1 the 
unqualified assessn1ents of judges or other fact finders. Paladino v. Adelphi 
[iniversi{y2++ illustrates this reasoning: The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant institution failed to adequately educate his child, but the court 
disn1issccl the case in large part because acljudicating it \vould have required 
the "fact finder to enter the classroon1 and detern1ine \Vhether or not the 
judgn1ents and conduct of professional educators \·Vere deficient."2+-'> The 
court \Vas loath to evaluate the "con1plex educational dctcrn1inations" 
nlade by the defendant.2+ti 'l'his type of judicial reluctance can greatly 
disadvantage plaintiffs by lin1iting the circun1Stances in \vhich they can \vin, 
or even seek, recovery for dan1ages. 
PlaintiIT<; use tort lav,1 and contract la\V frequently as bases upon \Vhich to 
sue educational institutions, but both provide only narrO\V paths to recovery 
in cases \vhere inisreprcscntation or fraud is alleged. 
2'1-1. 5'ee FOSTER, supra note 23, al 2+ ("[L]cgal aid attorneys believe that 1nosl students 
who have been n1islcd by institutions do nol cmnplain; and, as a result, the nu1nbcr of 
co1nplaints is not an adequate indication of the level of fraud and abuse perpetuated by 
son1e for-profit institutions."). 
242. Linehan, s11j1n1 note 7, al 764. 
2'~3. See id. ("[Ilhc doctrine of acadcn1ic abstention rcOccts courts' ... reluctance lo 
delve into the operation of educational institutions .... "). 
244. 454 XY.S.2d 868 (App. Di,·. 1982). 
2'1-5. Id. at 873. 
2'1·6. Id. at 872. 
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A. Tortlaw 
In tort la\·Y, the n1ost logical cause of action for victims of proprietary 
school fraud sccn1s to be fraudulent misrepresentation. Generally, a target 
of a fraudulent n1isrcprcscntation n1ay recover clan1agcs if the n1akcr of the 
misrepresentation knc\v or should have kno,vn that it \Vas false or baseless 
(scicntcr)2~ 7 and the target justifiably relied on the n1isrcprcscntation to his 
dctrimcnt. 2"18 In order for the target's reliance to be justified, the 
n1isrcprcscntation n1ust be n1atcrial-or in other \·Vords, the person n1aking 
the 111isrcprcscntation n1ust kno\\' or should kno\v that the target \·vill 
"attach in1portancc to [the n1isrcprcscntation] in determining his choice of 
action in the transaction in question ... "2-t!l Additionally, liability can 
attach \·vhen the n1aker of a niisrepresentation knovvs or should kno\v that 
the target vvill rely on the n1isreprcscntation, even if a reasonable person 
\vould not. 2·'i0 
A typical scenario during \vhich an adn1issions representative induces a 
student to enroll based on tu~justifiably rosy future job prospects scen1s to 
comprise a textbook case of fraudulent misrepresentation. The 
representative b1ovvingly n1akcs a representation that is baseless, if not 
fraudulent, in order to induce cnrolln1cnt, vvhilc the representative knovvs 
that the target vvill justifiably attach importance to the virtual pron1isc of a 
\vell-paying job. Hovvever, courts arc reluctant to a\vard dan1agcs to 
plaintifii;; in fraudulent n1isrcprcsentation cases against educational 
institutions; ty1)ically, only the 111ost barefaced instances of fraud arc 
successful.2·" 1 The prin1ary difficulty plaintiffs face in these cases is proving 
scicntcr on the part of the dcfendanr.2.12 In representing future job 
prospects, proprieta1y schools arc able to hide behind the fact that niuch of 
vvhat dctcrn1ines a graduate's job prospects is outside of the school's 
control.2Y~ At least one court has characterized such representations as "no 
n1ore than a prophecy," in highlighting the lin1itcd po\ver schools have in 
securing en1ployn1cnt for their graduates. 2.'i-t But this vic\v allo,vs schools to 
111akc baseless fonvard-looking clain1s vvith in1punity by shielding the111 on 
the back encl, vvithout restricting their representations on the fi·ont end. 2.'is 
24"7. RESTATEl'dE1'T(S1·:co~n) OF TORTS§ 526 (1977). 
248. Jd.§537. 
249. Id. § 538(2)(a). 
250. Id. § 538(2)(b). 
251. See, e.g., Linehan, sujJI"(/ nolc 7, at 770 (discussing the heightened pleading 
requirements for con1plainls alleging intentional fraud). 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Schwitters v. Des 1'1oincs Con11ncrcial Coll., 203 N.,V. 265, 265 (IO\\'a 1925). 
255. See Linehan, supra note 7, at 768 (''By pron1ising outcon1es which in some way 
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It seems that acadcn1ic abstention has fostered reluctance on the part of 
judges to critique \vhat an1ounts to sales pitches) due to the tangential 
relationship of these pitches to the educational process. Therefore, 
fraudulent n1isrcprcscntation fails to provide a ,,lablc avenue of redress for 
n1ost victi1ns of proprietary school n1isrcprcscntations. 
In addition, plaintiffs alleging negligence have been largely 
unsucccssful. 256 For this discussion, the l\VO n1ost rclc\'ant negligence clain1s 
arc negligent n1isrcprcscntation and educational n1alpracticc. In order for 
a negligent 1nisrcprcscntation clain1 to be successful, the plaintiff 1nust sho\v 
that the clefenclant, \vhile acting in a business or professional capacity, 
supplied false inforn1ation that \Vas negligently obtained or con1n1unicatcd, 
upon \vhich the plaintiff justifiably relied to his dctrin1ent.2·17 Educational 
malpractice is pren1iscd on the clain1 that the institution failed to provide 
the plaintiff an adequate education, thereby causing harn1, such as failure 
to prepare the plaintiff for cn1ployn1ent. 2.'iH 
Both clain1s tend to fail because courts arc reluctant to in1pose a duty of 
care upon educational institutions for their student outcon1cs. For instance, 
in Tolnlan v. CenCor Career College:,~ Inc., 2·19 a group of forn1cr students of the 
defendant institution asserted various negligence clain1s relating to the 
quality of the education they received and the advertisen1ents used by the 
clefcndant. 21;11 In disn1issing all of the negligence clain1s, the court cited the 
"collaborative and subjective process through \.vhich education is 
undertaken and the "outside factors" that detcrn1ine a student's level of 
depend on student ability, labor clc111ancl, or other factors outside thC' C'ontrol or the school, 
the school can e1nploy deceptively persuasi\·e statcn1cnts about the benc/its to be reaped 
fron1 their progra1n with lit Lie threat or liability under a fi:·audulcnl tnisrcprcscntalion ton 
action."). 
256. Generally, negligent conduct can be rouucl where 
(a) an act which the actor as a rcasonabk 1nan should recognize as involving an 
unreason a bk 1isk of causing an in\·asion or an interest of another, or (b) a !~lilure lo do 
an act which is necessary Cor the protection or assistance or another and which the 
actor is under a duty to do. 
H ..EST.-\TE.\IEXl' (S1-:c:oxn) OF TORTS§ 28:J. (1965j. :>:egligence lawsuits against proprietary 
schools usually allege that Lhc school failed to pro\'ide training or education it had a duly to 
provide. 
257. See, e.g., .A1naral \·. A1n. Sch. or Correspondence, 107 F. App'x. '1-97, 4-98-99 (61h 
Cir. 200'1-). 
258. Sec, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Uni\·., 95 7 F.2d 410, 4 I 2 (7th Cir. l 992). 
259. 851 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1992). 
260. Specifically, Lhc clain1s alleged negligence in infonning plaintilTs or the type of 
education they would receive, negligence of a specialist in technical education, and 
negligence based on derendants' failure to avoid false or misleading advertising. Id. at 204-
05. 
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succcss.2G1 The court concluded that "there is no vvorkablc standard of 
care" that could be in1poscd upon schools. 2(i2 1\nd of course, \Vithout a 
heightened standard of care or duty, no negligence clain1 can stand. 
J\!Iorcovcr, courts have aln1ost universally rejected education n1alpracticc as 
a recognized cause of action.'..'t;:i They have cited various public policy 
considerations as reasons for this broad rcjcction. 2(i-J- But the failure of both 
educational n1alpracticc and negligent n1isrcprcscntation can be traced 
back to the judicial reluctance that characterizes the acadcn1ic abstention 
doctrine. '..'(;.J 
B. Contract Lau:.-' 
Breach of contract suits stand a better chance of success than those 
asserting negligence; this is because it is generally settled that the 
relationship benveen a student and his or her educational institution is 
contractual in nature. 2Mi Promises made by an institution or its 
representatives arc binding.2<' 7 Catalogs and other n1aterials made available 
to the student by his institution help define the contours of the contractual 
rclationship.268 If certain pro111ises arc not kept by the institution, the 
student could have a claim of breach of contract. 2i;9 In Ross v. Creighton 
Universi!J, a forn1er student-athlete brought a lc.nvsuit clain1ing that the 
defendant institution failed to provide pron1ised tuto1ing services and other 
acadcn1ic accon1n1odations.'..'11l 'fhe court allo\vcd the plaintiffs contract 
26 J. Id. at 205. 
262. Id. 
263. Ros:,, 957 f.2d <ll "~12, '1-14, +16 (characte1izing educational n1alpracticc dai111s as 
"bclo\·cd of conunentators, but not of courts," and identifying l\Jontana as the only slate 
that allows educational 1nalpraeticc clain1s to go (()l"•sard). 
26+. See, e.J;,., id. at '1·l+ (discussing reasons courts have rt'.jcctcd educational 1nalpracticc 
as a cause ofaetion, including the lack ol"a standard of care, uncertainty about the cause and 
nature 0Cda1nages, the potential kn· niass litigation, and the possibility that courts would be 
forced to oversee the operations or schools). 
265. Linehan, supra note 7, at 771. 
266. \Vickstron1 \". X. Idaho Coll., 725 P.2d lSS, 157 (Idaho 1986) ("There seen1s to be 
alrnost no dissent fro111 the proposition that the relationship [between institution and 
student] is contractual in nature."). 
267. CcnCor, Inc. v. Tohnan, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 199'1-). 
268. Ross, 95 7 F.2d at 416. 
269. /d.at417. 
270. Ross was a basketball player who entered Creighton \\~th known acadc111ic 
deficiencies. In his con1plaint he averred that Creighton breached its pro111ise to provide 
Ross ''an opportunity lo participate, in a 111caningful way, in the acaden1ic progran1 or the 
'Cni\Trsity despite his aeaden1ic background" in return for his promise to play basketball. 
'fhc breach arose fron1 Creighton's alleged failure to provide Ross with tutoring services, an 
opportunity and directive to take advantage of those services, an athletic redshirt that would 
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clain1s to proceed because they could "point to an identifiable contractual 
pron1isc that the defendant failed to honor."211 
The Ross court's cn1phasis on specific pron1iscs is central to ho\v the 
propriety of these types of cases is assessed. The court articulated a 
standard for \vhcthcr a contract claim of this sort can stand: \Vhcthcr ruling 
on the issue \vould require the court to delve into the nuances of 
"educational processes and theories" or allO-\\' it to 1nakc "an objective 
assessment" of \vhcthcr the institution failed to n1akc good on pro111iscs.212 
If the allegation requires the former, it cannot stand; if it allo"vs the latter, it 
can be pursued on the n1erits. 21 ::i The forn1cr approach \voulcl, of course, 
run afoul of the acadcn1ic abstention doctrine, \vhilc the latter \vould not. 
Unfortunately, the practical effect of this approach is sin1ilar to the effect on 
tort clain1s; institutions arc allovved to n1akc n1isrcprescntations that arc 
clear in their in1plications, but vague enough to evade legal obligation. J\s a 
result, \vhen a student suffers dan1ages arising fron1 these legally vague but 
practically convincing misrepresentations, options for redress arc li1nited. 
C. Consumer ProLecLion 
State consun1er protection statutes theoretically provide avenues for 
redress, as practically every state allo,vs victin1s of fraud to sue for 
clan1ages. '.U.J- So1ne states even have consu1ner protection statutes 
specifically addressing the operation of proprietary schools.27J Ho,vcver, 
the standards of proof required by these statutes often n1ake \Vinning 
dan1ages difficult fOr victin1s. 21fi Son1e of these statutes require victin1s to 
prove scicnter and proxin1ate causc,277 creating the san1c difficulties 
allow hin1 lo better focus on acadcn1ics, and funds lo attain a college degree. Id. at 4 I 6. 
27 L Id. at '1·17. 
272. Id. 
273. See id. (dis111issing the plaintiffs negligence dai1ns while prese1ving his contract 
daiins). 
274. Sheila B. Schcucnnan, 17ie Consumer Fraud Clas.1· Arlivn: R1'i11i11g in :Jbure b] Rtq11iri11g 
Pfaintjifs lo Allege Reliance as an Ersenlial Element, 43 l-It\R V.J. O:'\ LEGlS. I, 23 (2006); sec alw Jon 
l'vlizc, Con11nent, Fencing Off the Path q/Least Re.n:1'/a11re: Rc-E<amini11g the Roll' ef Li!tk FTC Act 
Actions in the l11w qf FaL1e Ad11erl1Ji11g, 72 TEN:'\. L. Rt-:\·. 653, 660 (2005) (listing "treble 
dainages, punitive dan1ages, statutory 1ninin1un1 da111agcs, and attorney's fr'cs" as the n1ost 
con1n1on da111agrs allowed by state consumer fraud statutes). 
275. See, e.g., Utah Div. of Conswner Prol., Postsecondary Proprietary Schools, 
hup:/ I consu1ncrproteclion.utah.goy/reglstrations/schools.ht1nl {last Yisitcd Aug. +, 20 I 0). 
276. Linehan, supra note 7, at 776. But sec i\Jize, Jupra note 274, at 661 (characterizing 
stale consun1cr fraud statutes as "the path of least resistance" in suits alleging false 
advertising). 
277. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Jvfichcner, 584A.2d 973, 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (''A.clual fraud 
has five elements which n1ust coalesce. There n1ust be (I) n1isrcprcscntation of a 111atcrial 
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dcsc1;bcd earlier. Also, hcc<Jusc some states lin1it attorney's fccs,27H it n1ay 
be difficult for son1c victin1s to find la\v·ycrs \villing to litigate cases in \vhich 
only a fc\V thousand dollars arc at issue. 
D. 17ze "Triad" 
J_.astly, victin1s of proprietary school fraud arc inadequately protected by 
the ~fitlc J\1 oversight n1cchanis111-also kno\\'11 as the "triad." The triad 
consists of the DOE, state regulatory bodies, and accrediting agencies. Its 
purpose is to ensure "that the 'gate' to student financial aid progran1s open 
only to those institutions that provide students \vith quality education or 
training \Vorth the tin1c, energy, and n1oncy they invcst."'.!7!1 ])QE's 
prin1ary functions \vithin the triad arc to verify institutional eligibility for 
Title I\1 funds2H 11 and to certify accrediting agcncics. 281 States provide 
oversight in n1any \vays) including through higher education regulatory 
agcncies)282 as '\veil as through indirect n1cans such as consu1ncr protection 
and con1n1crcc la'\vs.283 J\ccrccliting agencies certify institutions as having 
1nct certain n1inin1um standards of quality. 28-l- Only institutions that arc 
accredited by an agency certified by the DOE can receive Title IV aicl.2B.1 
None of the con1pone1its of the triad provides nluch relief for victims of 
prop1ictary school n1isrcprescntations. The DOE only provides a lin1itccl 
111cchanisn1 for v:ictin1s to lodge con1plaints, 2BG and that n1cchanisn1 docs not 
fact; (2) scienter; (3) intention by the dcclarant to induce action; (4)justifiablc reliance by the 
party defl-audcd upon the n1isrcprcscntation; and (5) danu1gc to the party dcfrauck-d as a 
proxin1atc result."). 
278. See, e.g., FL.\. ST.-.\T. ~ 501.2105(1) (1998) (placing the awarding of attorney·s kcs 
within the discretion of the trial judge). 
279. G:\.O, E\"SL'RL\G QL.:.-.\LITY, .mjHa note 27, at "L 
280. .c\.n cxa1nplc or this function is DOE\ tracking of cohort ckh1ult rates. id. at +. 
281. See id. at 4-5 (noting that DOE ''ccnifles that such agencies arc reliable authorities 
as to what constitutes quality education or training pro\·idcd by postsecondary institutions"). 
2B2. Ser id. at 5 (slating that these agencies arc often responsible for establishing 
standards for regulation of higher education institutions). 
283. See id. ("Other state agencies define certain consun1cr protection 1ncasures, such as 
refund policies. In the nonnal course of regulating co1nn1crcc, all slates require 
postsecondary institutions to have a license to operate within their borders.''). 
284. See id. at 5-6 (".l\ccrcditing agencies adopt criteria they consider to rcDect the 
qualities of a sound educational progra1n and develop procedures for evaluating institutions 
to dctcnnine whether they operate at basic levels of quality."). 
285. Set id. at 11--6 (describing the accreditation process). 
2B6. See .·lnti-Fmud Ilearings, supra note I 0, at 23-24· (statcn1cnt of Rep. 1v1axine \Vatcrs) 
("fT]hc Dcpartrnent docs not investigate charges n1ade by students regarding 
inisreprcsentations 111adc to inDucnce students to enroll ... [;] these federal regulations have 
no private 1;ght of action, and can only be enforced by the Department, which docs not do 
it.o.job."). 
Number 3 •Volume 62 • Summer 2010 •American Bar Association ·Administrative Law Review 
"'Your Results May Vary': Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through 
Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations" by Aaron N. Taylor, 
published in the Administrative Law Review, Volume 62, No. 3, Summer 2010. 
© 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in 
an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
20101 TIGHJER l?EGUIA 110.\ ·OF Sc1-100L l?EPRESF.,\ ·r..J T10.::v:s 769 
include a private right to dan1agcs. 287 l\1orcovcr, fines and other sanctions 
in1poscd upon schools by the DOE arc often inadequate disincentives to 
unscrupulous bchavior. 2BB 1~hc shortcon1ings of state oversight have 
already been discussed. 1\nd accrediting agencies often provide insufficient 
and conflicted oversight of the institutions they ccrtify.2B~1 Such lax 
oversight al!o,vs unscrupulous institutions to stay in operation and continue 
to v:ictin1izc students. 
VJ. REGCL\TJ:\'G HIGHER EDCCATIO:\' REPRESE:\'TATJO:\'S 
The proposals presented in this section have a singular focus: to reduce, 
if not prevent, incidences of misrepresentations made by proprietary 
schools in order to induce cnrolhncnt. The proposals arc not focused on 
deterrence per sc, as penalties against offending schools arc not presented. 
Sin1ilarly, avenues of redress for victin1s of n1isrcpresentations arc not 
directly proposed. Pragmatism is the n1otivation behind this narro"v focus; 
the goal of this Part is to present solutions that account for the n1ultifaceted 
nature of higher education oversight and the sensitive nature of con1mcrcial 
speech regulation \·vithout getting bogged dovvn in their con1plcxity. As 
such, the principle thrust of the proposals is to harness current regulatory 
frame\vorks in nc\v ,.vays. 
The proposals arc organized around t\·VO areas of focus: (1) proprietary 
school n1arketing, and (2) recruitment. ' 1Vhile there is ovcrlap.bet,vccn the 
t\VO areas, there arc certain distinctive halln1arks of each. For purposes of 
this Article, n1arketing pertains to the efforts of proprietary schools to 
pron1otc their progran1s to prospective students via \Viele-reaching n1cans. 
1\dvcrtising, \Vhcther on television, online, or in print, is the principle 
n1ethocl of proprietary school n1arkcting. Rccruitn1ent pertains to the 
representations n1ac\c and 111ethocls used to enroll individual students. 'fhc 
tactics of achnissions representatives arc central to this area of focus. 
287. See Linehan, supra note 7, al 788 (noting that "nothing is done to coinpcnsatc the 
victin1"). 
288. S(:e, e.g., Anti-Fraud l-Jearing.i, supra note I 0, at 21 (staten1ent of Rep. l\Jax.ine \Vatcrs) 
("[T]he school doing the defrauding inay be allowed to pay a few cents on the dollar to settle 
clai1ns with llic Dcpa11n1cnt, or placed on rcitnbursc1nent status so that they have to wait 45 
days for payn1ent of financial aid."). 
289. See id. al 17 ("[T]here is a built-in conflict of interest will1 respect to accrediting 
agencies, because they have no incentive to revoke accreditation since their incomc-strcain is 
directly detcnnincd by the nun1ber of schools they accredit."). 
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A. ProjJosals 
To protect students and taxpayers fl-0111 n1isrcprcscntations and 
in1propricty fron1 proprietary schools, tighter regulation of their n1arkcting 
practices is necessary. First, proprietary schools should be required to place 
disclain1crs on all advcrtiscn1cnts n1aking for\vard-looking clai111s. Second, 
the Federal rfradc Con1n1ission should expand its regulations pertaining to 
proprietary school advertising. Third, the FTC and the proprietary school 
industry should encourage sclf-rcguhnion of proprietary· school advertising 
practice. In addition to tighter regulation in the n1arkcting area, existing 
regulation of proprietary schools' rccruitn1cnt practices should be 
expanded. Specifically, proprietary schools should be required to n1akc 
affinnativc disclosures and provide relevant labor niarkct inforn1ation to 
students p1ior to enrolln1ent. 
B. Relevant Oversight Agencies 
Five types of entities play significant roles in regulating higher education 
and con1n1crcial speech. These entities arc the DOE, the Federal 'T'radc 
Con1n1ission (ITC), state regulatory agencies, accrediting agencies, and 
self-regulatory bodies. Due to their integral role in the proposals, a brief 
overvie\v of each entity's oversight function is necessary. 
1. Ille DejJarl!nenl (}/'E'ducaLion 
The prin1ary role of the DOE \vithin higher education is to certify 
institutional eligibility for 'l'itlc I\1 financial aid funds. In addition to 
collecting va1ious forn1s of data and pro,.iding oversight of accrediting 
agencies, the Departn1ent oversees entrance cxan1 publishers2'.lO and dictates 
education policy. The DOE also accepts co111plaints filed by persons 
"suspecting fraud, \vaste[,] or abuse involving [DOE] funds or 
progran1s. "2'.ll 
290. See, e.g., G.-\0, STRO.!\GER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, at 9-l l (slating that thC' 
DOE is "responsible for overseeing Lest publishers" and setting standards). 
291. t:.S. Dcp'l of Educ., Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Hotline, 
http:/ /w,vw.cd.gnv/about/offices/list/oig/hotlinc.htn1l (last visited Aug. 4-, 20 l 0). 
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2. The Federal Trade Conunission 
'The FTC is responsible for regulating and enforcing advertising Ja,vs.'.!~12 
'rhc Con1n1ission is principally conccn1cd \Yith pron1oting fair con1pctition 
through truth in advcrtising.'.!!l:l The ITC pron1ulgatcs both general and 
industry-specific advertising standards, and it also assists industries in 
developing their O\vn standards and best practices. '.!'l+ The FTC has c\cvisccl 
guides that explain ho\v its rules arc applied to specific industries, '.2'l.'i 
including one that addresses advertising practices of private vocational and 
distance education schools. 2~Hi In pursuing sanctions against offending 
advertisers, the FTC can bring Ja,vsuits and adn1inistrativc actions.:!!)/ 
'fhrough these actions, the FTC can seek va1ious for1ns of relief, such as 
injunctions, corrective advertising, nlonctary penalties, and consun1cr 
redress. :!9B 
3. SLale Regulafo1)' Agencies 
Every state has a higher education regulatory body that oversees the 
operations of postsecondary institutions vvithin its borders. Son1c states 
have agencies that specifically oversee proprietary institutions.:!9'l The 
'29'2. See Patiicia P. Baiky, L'rifair Competition and Jiisfeading Arlui:rti-1·i11g: flow Adul.'rti.1i11g is 
Rl'g11lated in llw lJnill'd Stall's, 511- A:'\TITRL:sT LJ. 531, 532 ( 19/Fi) (''Cong1Tss authorized the 
agency ... to challenge 'unfair or decepti\·e acts or practices· to pron1otc truth in ackenising 
and fr1ir 1ncrchandising practices. rfhe Corn1nissio11's goal is ... to ensure that consuincrs 
receive both the infonnation necessary Lo inakc inforn1cd choices in the n1arketplace and the 
opportunity to use that infonnation r/Tccti\·cly. "). 
29'.3. See id. ("[T]he Cornn1ission in\·cstigatcs co1nn1crcial beh;_n·ior that n1ay be dccepti\T 
· or unf<lir, including ackcrtising. ). 
2~J4. O\·er the last two decades, the Federal Trade Co111n1ission {FTC) has gradually 
shifted away frmn rulc1naking, !Ocu~ing instead on cnforccincnt. The reason !Or this shift is 
that rukn1aking is seen as labor-intcnsh·c and controversial. R.ulnnaking is now typically 
undertaken at the behest ofCong1Tss. Today, the ITC's p1in1ary 111ethod ofrulcn1aking is 
the public workshop confl·rencc, where industry stakeholders (e.g., business entities, 
consun1er groups, other federal agencies, and state law cnforcen1ent officials) arc brought 
together lo discuss proposed rules changes. The input pro\·ided in these conferences help 
infonn the rules prmnulgatcd by the FTC. See geneml!J' Lydia B. Parnes & Carol Jennings, 
Ihrough the Looking G!aJs: .A Pcnj1ecth1i: 011 Regulalol)' Refbrm al the Federal Tmrle Comm£1.1ion, 49 
AD.\IL\. L. REV. 989, 998-99 ( 1997) (describing the role of workshop con!Crences). 
295. Id. at 992 n.l+ (noting that industry guides provide "an interpretation of the 
underlying statute, but [do not afford] an independent basis for en/Orcemcnt action"). 
296. Guides for Private \locational and Distance Education Schools, 16 C.F.R. pt. 254 
(2010). 
297. See, e.g., Bailey, J11pm note 292. 
298. Id. at 533. 
299. For example, the Xorth Carolina Office of Proprietary Schools is a division of the 
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extent of O\'Crsight provided by state higher education regulatory bodies 
can be broad, cncon1passing operational aspects of institutions as \vcll as 
institutional 1narkcting practices. ::ion Every state also has a consun1cr 
protection agency that provides oversight of various aspects of con1n1crcc, 
including advcrtising.::ioi Son1c of these agencies have di\,isions that 
specifically oversee proprietary institutions. :-;o~ 
4. Jlccrediting Agencies 
;\ccrcditing agencies assess and certify that institutions receiving Title IV 
funds arc of suflicicnt quality. These agencies arc non-govcrnn1cntaP(n and 
arc ty1)ically fanned by peer institutions seeking to devise and pron1otc 
certain educational standards.30+ These standards, ho\vcvcr, arc rarely 
concrete, allo,ving individual schools to define their O\Vl1 missions. ·m.J 
Federal Ja,v n1andatcs this flcxibility,:m(i though accrediting agencies arc 
allovved to set standards that can trun1p institutional standards. :-1o 7 
i\ccrcditation is voluntary; ho\vevcr, only accredited institutions can receive 
1'itlc IV funds. :-108 
State Board of Con11nunity Colleges. X.C. Co1nn1unity Colleges, Proprietary Schools, 
hllp://www.neec~.ce.nc.us/Prop1ietary_Sehools/ (last visited Aug.+, :.2010}. 
300. Set, l'.g., LT . ..\H CODI·: A:\:\. § 13-'.14-IOB (2009) (requiring fair and accurate 
111arkcting practices and Ii.ill disclosure or relevant institutional infonnation before any 
applicant enrolls in a Ctah proprietary school). 
30 I. .5ff, t'._!f,., Scheuennan, .rn/Jm note 274-, al 23 & nn.JGJ-·62. 
'.102. Sec, e.g., Ctah Div. of Consun1cr Prot., supra note 27S (pro\"iding instructions !Or 
postsecondary proprietary schools Lo con1plctc registration with the Utah Di\·ision or 
Consu111cr Protection, as required by state law). 
303. In n1ost countries, accreditation is a govcnH11c11tal li.mction. Ho\l'ever. concerns 
abnul !Cckralisin ha\·e pro1npled Congi-ess lo place the responsibility ofinslitutional ciuality 
assessrnent in the hands of these p1ivate entities. There arc about 3,500 accredited 
institutions nationwide, and the vasl n1ajority ofthen1 an.' for-pro!i.L FOSTER, supm note 23, 
at 18. 
304-. G.1\0, E.'\SC!Ui\G QUALJTY, supra note 27, at 5-6. 
305. See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 2'.3, at 19. 
306. 20 C.S.C. § !099b(a)(5)(A) (2006} ("L1]hc standards for accreditation o/"the agency 
or association assess the institution's success with respect to student achievement in rcblion 
to the institution's n1ission ... " which 1nay include di!Tercnt standards for difICrent 
institutions or progra1ns, as established by the institution.}. 
307. DRE\'KER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, EDCCATJON LAW ALERT: HlGHER EoL:CATIO.'\ 
OPPORTL:NJTY .!\Gr FINAL RcLE-ACCREDITJi\G .AGE.'\CY RECOG;\"JTJO:'\ 1 (2009), 
http:/ I w>vw.d1inkerbiddle.eo1n/ liles/Publication/88e5ba42-9a l 2-4632-b4· l 6-
09b:3a 151 Od27 /Prescntation/PublieationAttachmcnt/ 4-3c2b066-f c38-48e 7-bbfc-
Oa2 7d I e85586/l-Iighcr_Eclucation_ Opportunit.pdf. 
308. See, FOSTER, supra note 23, at 2, 4. 
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5. Se!J~Regulalo~11 Bodies 
\Vithin the rcaln1 of advcrtising1 vanous self-regulatory bodies pro111otc 
good advertising practices. :·HJ!I Generally, the pu11)oscs of self-regulation arc 
t\vofold: to pro1notc a set of industry norrns and best practices, and to 
provide a n1cans of applylng and enforcing these norn1s.:~ 10 As it concerns 
advertising, self-regulation is also intended to protect consun1crs and foster 
fair con1pctition-n-\·o goals that arc highly co1npatiblc \Vith frcc-n1arkct 
idcals.:111 l_.ikc accreditation, participation in a self-regulatory schcn1c is 
voluntary. In the n1ost developed arrangc111cnts, these bodies \Vork directly 
\vith the FTC and state agencies in regulating advertising.:ll'! 
C'. J)iscussion 
Proprietary schools invest heavily in n1ass n1edia advertising. They 
spend upv11ards of one billion dollars each year pron1oting their 
progran1s.:1i3 Their con1n1ercials don1inate non-pri1ne-tin1e television, and 
their online ads seem on1nipresent.3 H But \.vhen it corncs to advertising, 
proprietary schools suffer fron1 a problcn1 con1n1on an1ong all educational 
institutions: their procluct--.,··education--is largely intangible.:i1.1 In n1ost 
cases, the only tangible n1anifestation of education is the diplon1a that is 
received upon con1plction. In attempting to sell their product and 
differentiate thcn1sclvcs fro1n con1petitors, nonprofit institutions often 
pron1ote tangible ancillaries to the educational experience, such as 
309. Silt geneml{y Bailey, .1upm note 292. 
310. Ixr'L CTR. FOR ALCOHOL POUCll·:s, ICAP H.EPORTS 9, SE!.F-REGL'L:-\TIU.'\ OF 
BE\'l~R:\GI~ ALCOHOi, A.D\'EK"l'l.':il.'\G I (2001), hllp://\\'W\l'.icap.org/portals/0/do\vllioad/ 
all_pdfa/I CAP _Reports_English I rcporl9 .pelf Q1cTcinaftcr IC.t\P REl'UK i·s J. 
311. See, e.g., Baiky, .rnjJra 1101c 292, at S3i ("An often-stated goal or the self-regulatory 
apparatus is to protect consun1ers f'ron1 decepti\T ackcrtising; there is no doubt in 1ny n1ind, 
howc\'cr, that another in1portant goal sen-eel by il is to protect-ir not necessarily to 
promote--f'air eon1pctition. "). 
312. Sl'e id. (describing how the Xational Advertising Division of the Council of Better 
Business Bureaus, Inc. and the Xational A_ckcrtising Review Board serve as \·aluabk 
eon1ponents to state and federal O\'Crsight of' advcrlising). 
313. Goldie Blun1cnstyk, Economic JJuwnlum i~ a Boon far For-Prqjil College.>, CHRO!\. 
1-IJGl-lER EnL:c:., Dec. 10, 2008, hup://chronicle.eo1n/article/Eeono1nic-Downturn-Is-a-
Boon/ 1400/. 
31 1L lJOP alone is the seventh biggest onlinc adveniser. Goldie Blun1enstyk, J\Jarketing, 
the For-Prefit H1<91, CHIU).'\. I-IJGHER Enuc., Dec. I, 2006, at .A.20, available al 
http:/ I ehronicle.con1/ article/1.Iarkcting-the-For-Prolil-\Vay /6212 I. 
315. See, e.g., A'iCTIL, .wpm note 105, at 31 (".Among the greatest challenges to 
successfully 1narketing higher education is the inherendy intangible- nature of the very thing 
that is being marketed."). 
Number 3 •Volume 62 •Summer 2010 •American Bar Association •Administrative Law Review 
"'Your Results May Vary': Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through 
Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations" by Aaron N. Taylor, 
published in the Administrative Law Review, Volume 62, No. 3, Summer 2010. 
© 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in 
an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
774 ,J.JJ.\1J\'1STR·1TIVE LA fl. REl'lEI 1 · [62 3 
attractive buildings and tangential student scrviccs_:}lli Proprietary schools, 
ho,vcvcr, tend to take a different tack; they n1akc n1orc concerted efforts to 
sell their products by tying thcn1 to tangible encl results, such as career 
advanccn1cnt and financial stabiliry.:ii 7 It is on these t)1Jcs of for-..vard-
looking ads that the FTC should require prominent disclain1crs. 
Frcc-n1arkct con1pctition requires that con1n1crcial entities be allo,vcd to 
con1n1unicatc \Vith consun1crs.31 B 'l'hcrcforc, con1n1crcial speech is given 
n1any of the san1c First A111cncln1cnt protections as regular spccch. 31 ~ 1 In the 
scn1inal case, Viiginia Slate Board qf' l;Jhannac_y 1:. Tliiginia C'itize11s Conslaner 
Council, the Supren1e Court re\~e\vecl the constitutionality of a \ 1irginia state 
la\v banning phannacies fron1 advertising prices. ·i'.w The Supreme Court 
struck do\vn the ban, reasoning that consun1ers in a free n1arket niust be 
en1po\vctcd by the free ilo\·\' of inforn1ation_:i21 This case represented a 
departure fron1 previous Court decisions suggesting that con1n1ercial speech 
fell outside the purvie\v of First An1cncln1cnt protection. :1 77 
In Viiginia State Board ef Pharmary, the Court insisted that First 
316. Id. at 17 (arguing that in seeking market differentiation, ''[c]ollcges and universities 
arc reduced to boasting of their multin1il\ion-dollar student recreation centers, [and] their 
nouveau chic dining residence halls"). 
:317. ITT ollen features graduates discussing how receiving their ckgTees positively 
affected not only their careers, but also their faini!y life. See, 1'.g., 1'viySpace.co1n, ITT Tech 
Con11ncrcial: "If I 'Yant to Do So1nething ] \Vill Do l'dy Best to Accon1plish It," 
http:// vicls.inyspace .con1/indcx.ef1n?fuseaction:::vids.inclividual& VidcoID:::69 I 1J.OB (lasl 
visited June 27, 2010). Howe\·er, this is nol lo suggest that proprietary school ads only !Ocus 
on careers and jobs. Proprietary school ads take a va1ie1y of approaches. In addition to ads 
Lhal focus on end results, other ads lout co1nponents or an institution's suite of services, such 
as those relating to student support. l:OP's ''I A1n a Phoenix" can1paigi1 provides exan1plcs 
of this approach. Sn:_. r~.g., "Cnivcrsity of Phoenix, L:OPX on Tcle\·ision: I An1 a Phoenix, 
http:/ /\nnv.phocnix.cdu/about_us/acl-can1paigi1s.hln1l (last \·isitcd Aug. 4, 20 l 0). 
:31B. Pauline l'd. Ippolito, 11'7wt Can l·Vi.' Lcamjivm Food Ad1.·erti.1·i11g Polio' over the Lrul 25 
l'Cm~r, J'.2 GEO. I\14.SO:\ L. RF,\·. 939, 9;)9 ('.2004') ("The ability of finns to speak to potential 
conswncrs about i1nporlant product characteristics is an essential c!cn1cnt of co111petition-it 
infOrn1s consun1crs and pushes linns lo offer better products.''). 
319. Bolger\'. Youngs Drug Prods. Coq)., 463 t.:.s. 60, 66 (I 9B3) (specifying that speech 
is cmn1ncrcial in nature when ( l) it is a paid-for ad\·ertiscn1ent (2) that rcCers to a specific 
product, and (3) is published in the econo1nic interest of the speaker; however, the Court 
indicated that not all three charactciislics arc necessary for speech to be considered 
co1nn1ercial); \Ta. State Bd. of Pharn1. v. \ 1a. Citizens Consu1ner Council, 425 L'.S. 7'1-8, 761 
(1976) ("[S]peech docs not lose its First ;\rnendn1cnt protection because 1noncy is spent to 
project it, as in a paid advtrlisc1ncnt of one forn1 or another."). 
320. Va . . S~all' Ed. qf P!unm., 425 l:.s. at 748. 
321. Id. at 765 ("So long as we prescrYc a predmninantly free enterprise economy, the 
allocation of our resources in large 1neasurc will be made through nun1erous private 
economic decisions. It is a 1natter of public interest that those decisions ... be intclJigcnt 
and well inC01mcd. To this encl, the free Oow of com1nercial information is indispensable."). 
322. Id. at 753. 
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Amcndn1cnt protections only extend to truthful and non-n1islcading 
con1n1crcial spccch,:-12:i and in a later case, C:enLral Hudson Gas & Electric C'or/J. 
v. Public Sei7Jice Conunission/i'2-t it explained that such speech can only· be 
restricted \vhcn the govcrnn1cnt proves it has a substantial interest and its 
restriction directly advances that interest in the least intrusive n1anncr 
possiblc.:l2.'> In Central Hudson, the Court struck do,vn a Ne"' York State ban 
on electric con1pany advertising. The Court reasoned that even though the 
state had a substantial interest in energy conservation, the challenged 
restrictions \vcrc "n1orc extensive than necessary"-and therefore could not 
stand. :l2{i The holdings in both fliiginia State Board q/ Phannac_y and Central 
Hudson affirn1 the Court's vic\v that the First 1\n1endn1cnt "favor[s] the 
disscn1ination of truthful product inforn1ation over governn1cnt suppression 
of ideas. "'.'i2i So any proposed regulation of proprietary school advertising, 
including required disclain1ers, 1nust serve a co111pelling state interest and 
be narro\vly tailored to serve that interest. 
1. Requiring Disclainiers 
The Supren1e Court has \Yeighed in on the issue of disclain1ers. \Vhen 
the Court struck do\vn a ban on attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar qf 
Arizona, the state bar association argued that attorney aclvcrtisen1ents vvcre 
inherently n1isleading due to the individualized nature of each potential 
client's necds.:128 ~fhe Court vvas unconvineed, ho\vevcr, reasoning that 
such a vic\v "assun1es that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize 
the lin1itations of advertising.":t?!l The Court further reasoned that correct 
but incon1plctc inforn1ation \vas better rcn1edied by more disclosure, not 
less.:;;:-rn As such, disclai1ncrs arc preferred over broader restrictions on 
'.123. Id. al 771 l''Unlruthful speech, con1nw1-cial or otherwise, has never been protected 
fOr its own sake."); see afro In re lnt'l I-larvcstcr Co., I 04 F.T.C. 94-9, I 0."16 ( 1984) \noting that 
clcccptivc ackenising "is hannful lo eonsun1crs, unclcnnines the rational functioning of the 
inarkctplacc, and ... never oITcrs increased efficiency or other counte1Yailing benefits that 
n1ust be consiclcrccl"). 
324. 447 C.S. 557 (19BOj. 
325. Id. at 566 ("For corn1ncrcial speech to con1c within [Firsl Arncnchnent protection], 
it at least 1nust concern lawful activity and not be 1nislcading. l'\ext, we ask whether the 
asserted govcn1111cntal interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
1nust dcten11inc whether the regulation clireclly advances the governincntal interest asserted, 
and whether it is not inorc extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."). 
326. Id. at 602. 
327. Tom \la]uck, .:'Jote, K~eeping J)ictary Supplement Regulatiom· Slim and Fit: Finding a Ilealt/9· 
Balance Between Patemalinn and Consumer Choice, 2 GEo.J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 285, 300 (2004). 
328. 433 c.s. 350, 372 (l976j. 
329. Id. at 374-75. 
330. Id. at 3 7S. 
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speech, such as bans. 
Disclain1crs serve nvo basic purposes: to prevent deception and to 
pron1pt advertisers to \vcigh the benefits of n1aking deceptive or incon1plctc 
clain1s in light of the costs of the disclain1cr.:~31 In arguing for required 
disclosures on fonvard-looking prop1ictary school ads, the author borro\vs 
language fi-on1 the Bates Court and characterizes these ads as correct but 
inco1nplctc. J-\s the con1n1c1Tials assert, higher levels of education arc 
positively associated 'vith higher incon1c lcvcls.:n~ In that sense, the 
inforn1ation is correct. 1~hc incon1plctcncss is in the suggestion that 
co1nplction of the progra1n assures higher incon1c and that con1plction itself 
is assured-or even likely. The association bet\veen education and inco111e 
is not absolute, and as discussed earlier, n1ost proprietary school students 
fail to persist to degree. Required diselain1crs \.Vould address the incon1plctc 
trcatn1cnt of these realities. Regulation such as this \vould n1cet the test put 
forth in Central !Judson: the state has substantial interests in protecting its 
citizens fron1 n1isreprescntations and reducing the public costs thereof, and 
disclain1crs directly addressing incon1plete inforn1ation \vould be the least 
restrictive manner of senring these interests. 
The ITC has required advertisers to use disclain1ers \.vhcn necessary to 
prevent deception.:JT:; Generally, clisclai111ers arc required to be 
conspicuously placed and easy to understand.:tH These basic requiren1cnts 
n1ake sense, because for a disclain1cr to be effective, it 111ust be noticed and 
understood by consun1ers. In its orders, the FTC is often very specific 
regarding the forn1, content, and placen1ent of disclosures. For instance, in 
acljuclicating !11 re La Salle Extension lJniversi{y, the Con1n1ission found that the 
respondent deceptively advertised its la\·v degree progran1 by not sufficiently 
disclosing its lack of accreditation. :ns J\s a result, it ordered the respondent 
to disclose the progran1's lin1itations \vith disclaimers "in type the sa111e size 
331. Ippolilo, .rnj1m note '.'31B, al 950 ("[IZ]cquiring [disclai1ncrs] raises 1hr finn's cost of 
rnaking the clain1s, and thr 'duller' of the added rcquiren1ents n1ay n1akc the clai1ns k:ss 
cffcctiYe as a 1narketing 1001. Ir these effects arr significant, they reduce lirn1s' incenti\'t~S to 
1nakc lhe clain1s at all.'"). 
332. See, e.,g., L'.S. lJep"t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stat.islics, Education Pays in lligher 
Earnings and Lower l.:nen1ployn1cn! Rates, http://\v\1'\r.bb.go\'/e1np/ep_chan_OOl.htn1 
(last visilcd Aug.+, 2010). 
333. See, e.g., In re La Salk Extension L'niY., 78 F.T.C. 1272, 1284 (1971) ("\Vherc. 
the n1erc offering of thr product or sen·ice !cads to deception ... we believe that it is 
reasonable and necrssary to de1nand that a disclosure required Lo dispel the deception be 
given equal pron1inence with the offer."). 
334. BUREAL: OF CONsL:.\IER PROT., FED. TR . -\DE COi\L\.l':\, DIETARY SL:PPLEi\IE\TS: t\i'\ 
AD\IERTJSJ!\'G GUIDE FOR IXDUSTRY 6 (2001), http://www.ftc.go\'/ 
bcp I cd u I pubs I business/ adv I b us09. pdf. 
335. 78 F.T.C. at 1272-73. 
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and appearance as the ad\'crtising clain1s_":-!'.1G Further, the FTC dictated 
the placcmcn(l:'ll and contcnf'l:'IB of these disclain1crs. 
Sin1ilar rcquircn1cnts could be placed on fonvard-looking proprietary 
school ads. In order to prevent deception, disclain1crs relating to lovv 
con1plction rates and the relationship bct\vccn education and earnings 
should be required con1poncnts of these ads. 1'hc follo,ving disclain1crs 
could be placed on ads: 
l\Iost students \\'ho begin acadcn1ic or training progran1s at this institution do 
not co1nplcic 1hcn1. 
Con1plcting the dct,,'1Tc/training docs not guarantee c1nployn1cnt or a higher 
salary. 
'rhcsc clisclain1ers should appear conspicuously on ads, using the san1e 
font size and appearance as the advertised elairris. In television ads, 
clisclain1ers could be displayed conspicuously on the screen or stated clearly 
by the narrator. 3::i:i These disclain1ers \Vould be particularly necessary for 
ads using consun1er testimonials, a con1mon 111arketing strategy for 
proprietary schools. The clain1s of consun1er endorsers n1ust be "typical" 
or a disclain1er is required_:1-1o Given proprietary school completion rates, 
any consun1er endorser touting the benefits of attaining a degree is arguably 
describing an atypical experience. I.astly, in determining 'vhether an ad is 
deceptive, the FTC \-\~II consider the ad's effect on a reasonable n1cn1ber of 
the targeted group-3·11 The previously discussed susceptibility of the targets 
'.J:l6. id. al 1280-81. 
'.·}'.17. Id. (requi1ing disclain1ers to be placed ''on the front page or CO\'cr and on each page 
or any pron1otional 1natcrial or descripti\'l:: brochure wherein respondent's law courses or 
law degrees arc n1cntioncd in typP the sa1nc size and appearance as the ad\·ertising dai1ns 
appca1ing thereon"). 
338. Id. at 1281 (requiring disclain1ers to state that ''courses arc not recogni:-:ed or 
accepted as sufficient education or legal training to qualiG1 the student to becmne a 
candidate for achnission to the profession of law in any oflhc Slates in the t:nitcd States or 
the District o/"Colun1bia"). 
339. A recent R.c1nington College con1111crcial ai1ing in the l\ashvillc, Tennessee area 
displayed two disclai1ncrs, including one stating, "Individual results nla)' vary." rfhe 
disclain1crs were displayed in very s1nall font and only appeared for ten seconds of the sixty-
sccond co1111nercial. Vi1nco.com, Ren1ington College Co1n1ncrcials, 
http://www.vi1neo.co111/2901500 (last visited Aug. '1·, 2010). 
3+0. ITC Guides Concerning l:se of Endorscn1cnt.s and Testi111oniais in Advertising, 
Consun1cr Endorse1nents, 16 C.F.R. § '255.2(b) ('2010). 
341. See John E. Villafranco & Andrew B. Lustiginan, Regulation ef J)ielal)' Supplement 
Adverti1i11g: Cunenl Claims ef Interest lo ilie Federal Trade Commiuion, Food and J)mg Adminfrlmlion 
and .1Vatio11al Advert1:ri11g Division, 62 Foon & DRCG LJ. 709, 723-24 (2007) (noting lhat "the 
degree or sophistication of the target audience is a significant factor in detennining the 
reasonable 1ncssage conveyed by the advertising" and explaining that the ITC has assessed 
both higher and lower standards of reasonableness). 
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of proprietary schools ads increases the need for disclain1crs. 
2. Expanding FTC Proprieta~'Y School Guides 
In fostering good n1arkct:ing practices, including the systcn1atic use of 
clisclain1crs, the F~fC should expand its Guides for Private \! ocational and 
Distance Education Schools.3-L' The ITC pro111ulgatcd the (;uidcs in 1972 
as a means of advising "proprietary businesses offering \'OCational training 
courses, either on the school's prcn1iscs or through distance education, ho,.,. 
to avoid unfair or deceptive practices in connection \v:ith the advertising, 
pron1otion, marketing, or sale of their courses or progra1ns.":H:l i\s such, 
the Guides address prohibitions against vanous types of 
n1isrepresentations.:l-H- Hovvever, the Guides only pertain to proprietary 
schools offering less than a hvo-year degTec.+tJ This lin1ited applicability 
docs not reflect the current reality of proprietary school education. \'\.Then 
the Guides \verc first enacted, very fe\v proprietary schools vvere offering 
degree progran1s. Today, nlany of these schools offer degrees through the 
doctoral level. 3-Hi In fact, at son1c of the largest proprietary schools, n1ost 
students arc enrolled in degree-granting progran1s.:H7 But irrespective of 
their evolving pro,gran1n1atic focus, the n1arketing strategy used by these 
schools has re111aincd rather consistent; they still tic their progran1s to labor 
n1arkct success. Thus, the dangers that the Guides \vere enacted to address 
have expanded beyond the scope of the Guides, necessitating a broadening 
of that scope. :Hu 
342. 16 C.F.R. § 254·(2010). 
343. Private \"ocalional and Distance Educatiou Schools, Request kir Public 
Co1nn1ents, 74 Feel. Reg. 37,973, 37,973 Uuly 30, 2009). 
344. 'fhcse n1isrepresentations concern the description of the school, its accreditation, 
the 1ransfCrability of credits, the content of ads and tcsti1nonials, teacher qualifications, 
courses offcrccl, the availability or cn1ployn1cu1 and !"inaucial aid, and cnrollrncnt 
qualifications. Id. at 37,973-74. 
345. 16 C.F.R. § 254·(a} ("These Guides do not apply to resident prin1ary or secondary 
schools or institulions of higher education offering at least a 2-ycar prognun of accredited 
college level studies generally acceptable !Or credit toward a bachelor's degree."). 
346. Sec GAO, STRO:'\GER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, at 1 ("In recent years, the scale 
and scope of proprietary schools h;-n-c changed considerably. Traditionally focused on 
ccrtificalc and associate prognuns ranging fron1 cosn1ctology lo n1cclical assistance and 
business achninistration, proprietary institutions have expanded their offerings to include 
bachelors, n1asters, and doctoral level prograins."). 
34-7. See l(JRP, ;,upra note 87, al 241 (describing a "new breed" or proprietary schools 
where the rnajority of students arc enrolled "in dcgTce progran1s !Or everything fron1 the 
associate degree to the Ph.D."). 
34-8. In July, 2009, the FTC requested public crnnn1ents on the (;uidcs "as part of its 
systematic review of [agency] guides and regulations." In ll1e request, the FTC presented 
eighteen questions relating to how the Guides can be n1adc n1orc cOCctivc. Kone or the 
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3. Encouraging Se//:_ Regulation 
The proprietary school industry, \Vi th the cncouragcn1cnt of the ITC, 
should forn1 a self-regulatory body to encourage good advertising practices 
\Vithin the sector. Industry self-regulation is an in1portant con1poncnt to 
FTC oversight and the overall prevention of fraudulent advertising. For 
cxan1plc, the National Advertising Rcv:ic\v C:ouncil (NARC),:l-1!1 an un1brclla 
self-regulatory agency, has set advertising guidelines for various industry-
spccific self-regulatory agencies, including those relating to electronic 
rctailing:rJo and children's aclvcrtising.:n1 ;\!so, the F"fC has incorporated 
self-regulatory agencies into its regulatory fran1e\vork. The Children's 
Advertising RcviC\V Unit (CARU) and the National Advertising Division 
(NAD) of the Council of Better Business Burcaus3·12 serve as initial rcviC\VCrs 
of challenged advcrtiscn1cnts. If an advertiser docs not agree \vith a 
questions directly related to expanding the scope or the Guides, though question three asks 
about possible 111odifications. 74-Fed. Reg. at 37,973-75. 
311-9. See Better Bus. Bureaus, Advertising Review Services, http:/ /w\\!\V.bbb.org/ 
us/ Ach'ertising-Review-Serviccs/ (last visited Aug. 4, 20 l 0) ("i-\n alliance or the Association 
of Xational Advertisers, the A1ne1ican Association of Advertising A.gencics, the A1ne1ican 
Ad\'crtising Federation and the Council of Heuer Business Bureaus. The :\ational 
Advertising Review Council's (.:'\ARC) n1ission is lo roster truth and accuracy in national 
advcrlising through voluntary self-regulation."). 
350. See Better Bus. Bureaus, Electronic R.etailing Self-Regulation Progran1, 
http://\v\1'\V.bbb.org/us/cleclronic-relailing-sclf-rcgulation-progT<lln/ (lasl visited ;\ug. 4-, 
2010) ("[rhe Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation ProgTa1n]'s 1nission is lo enhance 
consu111er confidence in electronic retailing. ERSP provides a quick and dfrclivc 
1nrchanisrn for t\·aluating, in\'cstigating, analyzingl,J and resolving inquiries regarding Lhe 
truLhfulness and accuracy of the piiinary or core cflicacy or perfonnance clain1s that arc 
co1nn1Lmicated in national dirrct response ach-ertising.''). 
35 J. St'e Better Bus. Bureaus, Children's .-\cl\'crtising IZc\'ic\1· "Cnit, 
hup://www.bbb.org/us/childrcn-ad\'crtising-1-c\'itw-unit/ (last visited Aug. 4-, 2010) (''l1'hc 
Children's Ach·r-nising Review L'nit (CA.R"C) of LilC' Council or Better Business Bureau~] is 
the children\ an11 of" the acl\'crlising industry's scH'..rcgulalion syslc1n and evaluates child-
direcled advertising and pro1notional 111.-ucrial in all 111cdia to ad\'ancc truthfulness, accuracy 
and consistency with its Se[fRegulalol)' Program }Or ChiMrm's .ldvertiring and relevant laws."); 
Better Bus. Bureaus, Children's Food and Beverage A.dvertising Initiative, 
http:/ /,vw1v.bbb.org/us/ childrcn-rood-bcverage-ad\·crtising-initialive/ (last visited Aug. 4-, 
20 I 0) (''The Initiative is a voluntary sclf-regulaLion prognun with many of the nation's 
largest rood and beverage cOJnpanics as participants. The Initiative is designed to shift the 
111ix of advertising n1essaging lo children to encourage healthier dietary choices and hcalLhy 
lifestyles."). 
352. See Better Bus. Bureaus, ~ational Advertising Division, hup:/ /wvvw.bbb.org/ 
us/us/national-advertising-division/ (lasl visited Aug. '1·, 2010) ("The n1ission of the ~ational 
t\clvertising Division (~AD) of the Council of Beller Business Bureaus (CBBB) is to review 
national advertising for truthfulness and accuracy and foster public confidence in lhe 
credibility of advertising."). 
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decision n1adc by CARU or N.A.D, it may appeal to the National 
Advertising Rcv:ic\v Board (NARB). :t'i:"l In assessing challenged ads, the 
FTC gives great \Vcight to precedent set by these quasi-judicial sclf-
rcgulatory agcncics.1"1-t 
A proprietary school self-regulatory body could be chartered through an 
in1partial agency such as the Better Business Burcaus.355 'fhc body could 
serve as a clearinghouse for best practices in industry advertising, as \vcll as 
a place \Vhcrc ad-related co111plaints could be brought by consun1crs and 
con1pctitors alike. Like C1\RU and NAD, the body could sc1V'c as an initial 
arbiter of con1plaints, \vi th appeals going to NARR. The proprietary school 
industry \Votild benefit greatly fron1 this type of self-regulation; it \vould 
in1provc the sector's credibility \·vith the public \vhilc encouraging healthy 
eon1pctition and possibly staving off closer govcrn111cntal scrutiny of its 
advertising practices. 
4. Requiring Aj/hmalive Disclosures 
The federal Student Right-to-.Kno\v and Can1pus Security Act requires 
all institutions receiving Title IV aid to n1ake \Viele-ranging disclosures to 
prospective and enrolled students. :Jso The disclosures n1ost pertinent to this 
discussion arc graduation rates and placen1ent rates. Under the Act, 
schools nlnst n1ake this inforn1ation "readily avaHable upon request" to 
prospective and enrolled studcnts.:t17 Further, schools nlust "provide to all 
enrolled students a list of the inforn1ation that is required to be provided . 
together \vith a staten1cnt of the procedures required to obtain such 
infOrn1ation_')35B By requiring schools to disclose this infonnation, the Act is 
ackno\vledging the predon1inant motivation of students engaging in higher 
education; it is also n1aking a po\vcrful policy statement-one that places 
outcon1cs at the focal point of assessn1ent. 
Unfortunately, the manner in \vhich the statute operationalizcs the 
rcquire1nents lessens their effectiveness. 'fhe only c\ocun1cntation a school 
n1ust provide is a list of inforn1ation it is required to nlakc available, and a 
process for obtaining that inforn1ation. In effect, the Act places the onus on 
353. ~at'l Advertising Review Bel., http://www.narbre\·iew.org-/ (last visited Aug. 4-, 
2010) (":'\ARB is the appeal division of the advertising industry's self-regulatory syslcn1."). 
354. Bailey, supra note 292, at S37 (noting that the ad\'crtising industry "has established 
two quasi-judicial regulatory bodies to review advertising," and that these agencies arc "a 
valuable con1ple1nent to federal and stale efforts to police against deceptive advertising"). 
355. CJ ICAP REPORTS, supra note 310, at I ("Impartiality is seen to bC' kC'y lo an 
effective [self-regulatory] code and public trust in it."). 
356. 20 U.S.C. § I 092 (2006). 
357. Id.§ 1092(a)(l). 
358. Id. 
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the student to not only request the inforn1ation, but take the necessary steps 
to secure it. It stands to reason that these unnecessary steps limit the 
dissemination of this information; therefore, proprietary schools should be 
required to affirn1ativcly disclose, at the very least, graduation rates and 
placcn1cnt rates to students before cnrolln1cnt and each academic year 
thereafter. Such a rcquirc1ncnt \Voulcl not be novel, as the Act already 
requires schools to disclose graduation rates and other data to athletes, their 
parents, and officials at their secondary schools.:15 ~i .c\lso, indiYidual states, 
like Utah, require proprietary schools to provide en1ploy111ent and 
graduation rate data prior to enrolling a student or accepting tuition 
payn1cnts.:;bo Such a require1nent \VOuld also 111ake it n1ore difficult for 
schools to use bureaucratic inconveniences to discourage students fro1n 
obtaining this inforn1ation. Oversight of this rcquiren1ent could be vvithin 
the purvic\v of the DOE, vvith assistance fron1 state regulatory and 
accrediting agencies. 
5. Expanding Disclosures 
Disclosure requircn1ents for proprietary schools should be expanded to 
include labor market data, specifically inforn1ation relating to labor 
dcn1and and salaI)'.3hl This expansion \VOuld be in direct response to 
proprietary school n1arketing and recruit1ncnt practices. Son1e of the 
occupational areas for vvhich proprietary schools provide training have little 
to no clcn1and.:lfi'.! ;\c\clitionally, salary data is often inflated by adn1issions 
represcntatives.:l(i:l Thus, providing this infor111ation to students prior to 
enrolln1ent \vill better infonn students, allo\ving the111, as consumers, to 
n1ake inforn1ed choices in the n1arketplace.:lG-t Sirnilar to a clisclain1cr, it 
359. Id. § !092(e)(2). But src id. § 1092(c)(6} (wai\·ing these rcquirnncnts ''for any 
institution or higher education that is a 1nen1ber or an athletic association or athletic 
conference that has \'oluntarily published coinpktion or graduation rate data or has agreed 
to publish data that ... is substan1ially con1parablc to the inforn1ation required under this 
subsection"). 
360. L'TAH CODE i-\:\:--.·. ~ l 3-34-108 (2009). 
361. This proposal :is based on a rccon11ncndation n1adc by the G.AO. Sec GAO, 
OvERSl;rrLJED OccL:PATJO:\S, .rnjJm note 22, at 13-1 +. 
362. See id. at 8 ("The Stuvlus or qualified job candidates, including proprietary school 
graduates, for so1nc occupations occasionally reached dran1atic proportions in sonic states, 
exceeding dc1nand by nuios or 10 to 1or1norc."}. 
36'.1. See Anti-Fraud Ilearings, .wpm note l 0, at S (slate1ncnt of Honorable George i\Jillcr) 
("[C]crtain colleges ... 1nisrcprcscnted graduation rates, pron1ised inflated salaries to 
prospective enrollees, [and] enrolled students who did not have the ability to complete 
casework .... "). 
364. GAO, OVERSLPPLIED 0CCLTPATIO:\"S, ~upm note 22, at 5 (""Csing labor market 
prqject:ions provides a rational basis IOr 1naking training invcst1ncnt decisions .... "). But .rec 
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\vould also pron1pt proprietary schools to consider the costs of n1aking 
clain1s that n1ay not be supported by the data. --ro ensure validity, the 
inforn1ation should be con1pilcd by a governmental agency or another 
entity certified by the DOE. 
co;;c1.csro;; 
Proprietary schools play an i1nportant role in broadening access to 
higher education. They enroll a large nu1nbcr of students 'vho arc 
undcrscrvcd by traditional, nonprofit institutions. These students tcn<l to 
be poorer, less educated, and older than students at traditional schools, and 
they tend to undertake higher education for very practical reasons. These 
characteristics n1akc thc1n n101T susceptible to deceptive n1arketing and 
unfounded promises of higher education providers. 
Proprietary schools invest heavily in n1arketing and recruitn1ent. They 
appeal to the characteristics and n1otivations of their market niche by 
pron1oting tangible end results of educational study, such as career 
advancen1ent and financial stability. Unfortunately, n1any of their ads and 
recruitn1ent practices 111akc representations that arc incon1plctc, or \Vorse, 
untrue. These behaviors contribute to Jo,v con1pletion rates and high loan 
default rates an1ong proprietary school stuclcnts-outcon1cs that cost 
students and taxpayers billions of dollars. 
To protect students and taxpayers fron1 proprietary school 
n1isrcprescntations and fraud, tighter regulation of their marketing and 
recruitn1ent practices should be in1posed. In the area of n1arketing, 
proprietary schools should be required to place disclain1crs on fon.vard-
looking ads. f\lso, the FTC should expand its regulation of proprietary 
school n1arkcting practices and encourage iinpartial self-regulation \.vithin 
the industry. In the area of recruitn1ent, proprietary schools should be 
required to n1akc affirn1ative and expanded disclosures. The goal of these 
reforn1s is to foster disincentives to misrepresentations and fraud. It rnust 
be noted that \vhilc the specific focus of this article is proprietary schools, 
the proposals could apply to any school that nlakcs forvvard-looking 
representations in inducing cnrolln1cnt. In the end, the nlcssagc should be 
that vvhilc educational attainn1cnt can, and often docs, yield benefits upon 
the possessor, these benefits arc not assured-and because of this, "Your 
Results Nfay Vary." 
id. (warning that labor tnarkct projections arc "inherently in1prccisc"). 
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